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Of “Texans” and “Custers”: 
Maximizing Welfare and Efficiency 
Through Informal Norms 
M. Alexander Pearl* 
ABSTRACT 
 
Professor Robert Ellickson (Yale) theorized that the informal 
norms of a close-knit community maximize aggregate welfare and 
Professor Barak Richman (Duke) identified two distinct types of 
private ordering systems: “shadow of law” and “order without law.”  
Under the Ellickson-Richman structure, many Indian tribes 
qualify as close-knit groups where informal norms effectively 
operate.  The additional trait of isolation—both geographic and 
cultural—makes them ideal communities for the prioritization of 
informal norms.  The imposition of external law, such as state law, 
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Law.  Enrolled member of the Chickasaw Nation of Oklahoma.  This article, 
or portions of it, has been presented to the faculties of Stetson University 
College of Law, the University of New Mexico School of Law, Florida Coastal 
School of Law, and St. Thomas University School of Law (Miami, FL).  I had 
the opportunity to discuss various ideas from this paper at the Berkeley Law 
Symposium “Heeding Frickey’s Call.”  I am forever indebted to Professor 
Frickey for his teaching and wisdom.  There are many colleagues and friends 
who contributed to my thinking about these issues.  Among them, I’d like to 
thank Hannibal Travis, Manuel Gomez, Matthew Mirow, Howard 
Wasserman, Tom Baker, Tracy Hresko Pearl, Matthew Fletcher, Ezra 
Rosser, Sarah Krakoff, Dr. Kelly Fayard, Curtis Berkey, Scott Williams, 
Rovianne Leigh, Mary Louise Frampton, Keith Harper, Dennis M. Gingold, 
John C.F. Loving, Robert Harmala and the myriad tribal leaders and 
advocates who have shared their knowledge and opinions with me.  A special 
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efforts.  All mistakes are mine.   
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is harmful and unnecessary to the maintenance of order in these 
communities.  Recent legislative efforts to ameliorate criminal 
problems in Indian Country miss the mark and an alternative 
solution prioritizing the operation of informal norms and private 




Of “Texans” and “Custers”: Maximizing Welfare 
and Efficiency Through Informal Norms 
 
“The Haileys refer to him as a ‘Texan’—a term that in  
 Shasta County connotes someone who is both an  
 outsider and lacks neighborly instincts.”1 
 
 —Robert Ellickson, Order Without Law. 
 
“There are better ways to solve these problems than by  
bringing in the 7th Cavalry and wiping them out. I  
would say we are in a war right now.”2 
 
—Former Chairman of the Soboba Band of Luiseno Indians 
on the Riverside County Police Department’s conduct regarding 
tribal members. 
 
In his famous work, Order Without Law, Professor Robert 
Ellickson provides “a real-world perspective” on the Coase 
Theorem.3  Ronald Coase’s The Problem of Social Cost is one of the 
most influential works on the law, giving rise to what would 
become called the Coase Theorem.4  The Coase Theorem—a term 
he never used to describe his own work—is often misunderstood 
and is subject to a variety of interpretations.5  For purposes of this 
 
 1.  ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW 63 (Harvard Univ. Press 
1991). 
 2.  David Kelly, Riverside County Tribal Members are Angry After Two 
Latest Killings by Deputies, L.A. TIMES LOCAL (May 14, 2008), 
http://www.latimes.com/news/local/la-me-soboba14-2008may14,0,5062286 
.story#axzz2jPqlW5cl. 
 3.  ELLICKSON, supra note 1, at 2. 
 4.  Id. 
 5.  Compare Charles K. Whitehead, Sandbagging: Default Rules and 
PEARLFINALWORD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/2/2014  10:57 AM 
34 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 19:32 
article, I employ Professor Ellickson’s recitation of the Theorem 
that “when transaction costs are zero, a change in the rule of 
liability will have no effect on the allocation of resources among 
the parties.”6 
This article expands upon Ellickson’s assessment of how 
social behavior is affected by law and other forces, such as the 
informal norms in a given social group.  His hypothesis states that 
“members of a close-knit group develop and maintain norms 
whose content serves to maximize the aggregate welfare that 
members obtain in their workaday affairs with one another.”7  
Ellickson’s empirical study of Shasta County provides a close look 
at how a “close-knit community” will encourage cooperative 
behavior within the group, without resort to external law, simply 
by application of diffuse informal community norms.8  Ellickson’s 
treatment of the position of law as central or peripheral to the 
behavior of community members is representative of a larger legal 
philosophical debate between Law and Society followers, and 
those in the Law and Economics camp.9 
The first quote from Ellickson’s book introduces the idea that 
within a close-knit group, “Texans,” exist as those whose behavior 
consistently deviates from the informal normative expectations.10  
One of Ellickson’s points is that the exercise of informal norms, 
including rewards and punishments, in a close-knit group 
effectively addresses internal deviations from expected behavior in 
a more efficient and welfare maximizing manner.11 
The second quote is a statement made by a former chairman 
of the Soboba Band of Indians located in Riverside County, 
California.12  The “7th Cavalry” statement refers to General 
Custer and his United States 7th Cavalry, who heavily 
 
Acquisition Agreements, 36 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1081, 1091 n.33 (2011) 
(describing different interpretations of the Coase Theorem), with Daniel Q. 
Posin, The Error of the Coase Theorem: of Judges Hand and Posner and 
Carroll Towing, 74 TUL. L. REV. 629 (1999) (challenging the validity of the 
Coase Theorem). 
 6.  ELLICKSON, supra note 1, at 2. 
 7.  Id. at 167. 
 8.  Id. 
 9.  Id. at 168. 
 10.  Id. at 63. 
 11.  Id. at 10. 
 12.  Kelly, supra note 2. 
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participated in many battles with various Indian tribes on the 
frontier of the United States.13  I define the term “Custer” as an 
individual existing outside of the close-knit group.  Consequently, 
a Custer is able to supersede the informal norms of the group.  
These individuals ignore, or are at least not bound by, the 
informal norms of the close-knit group.  The remedial actions 
taken by members of the close-knit group, therefore, are 
ineffective in curtailing a Custer’s deviations from the expected 
behavior of the community.  This article examines how Texans 
and Custers affect the informal norms of the close-knit group and 
vice versa, resulting in a conclusion about the extent to which 
informal norms should be insulated from the operation of external 
mandatory law. 
The scope and thesis of this article is narrow, and a few 
caveats must be given.  This article does not seek to add to the 
copious scholarship bearing directly on the Coase Theorem.  Nor 
does it attempt to join in the legal centralist vs. legal peripheralist 
dialogue.  Further still, this article is not a “real-world 
perspective” like that accomplished by Ellickson.  Instead, this 
article attempts to add to the ideas articulated by Ellickson by 
applying his hypothesis to other situations beyond property and 
tort law—the areas of law typically associated with Coase’s 
Theorem.14  Specifically, I argue for the protected operation of 
informal norms within certain close-knit groups with regard to the 
regulation of criminal conduct. 
Legal academia’s interest with informal norms (which goes by 
many other names, e.g. private enforcement mechanisms, private 
ordering, etc.) is not necessarily new.15  As Professor Weisberg has 
pointed out, the “norms school” has not necessarily discovered a 
new idea.16  Indeed, Weisberg has criticized the norms school for 
 
 13.  See generally THOM HATCH, THE CUSTER COMPANION: A 
COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO THE LIFE OF GEORGE ARMSTRONG CUSTER AND THE 
PLAINS INDIAN WARS (Stackpole Books 2002).  In no way do I intend for this 
article to be a referendum on Gen. Armstrong Custer’s conduct, legacy, or life 
in general.  Instead, I use his mythos and image as expressed by the former 
chairman of the Soboba Band as a contrast to the “Texan” archetype 
identified in Ellickon’s work.   
 14.  ELLICKSON, supra note 1, at 3. 
 15.  Barak D. Richman, Norms and Law: Putting the Horse Before the 
Cart, 62 DUKE L.J. 739, 740 (2012). 
 16.  Robert Weisberg, Norms and Law: and the Norms of Criminal Law 
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engaging in sloppy or merely conclusory analysis of informal 
norms in the criminal context.  This article is not a response to 
Weisberg, but instead attempts to faithfully apply Ellickson’s 
theory to certain close-knit groups in the criminal area. 
Put simply, the issue explored here concerns the extent to 
which informal norms should either (1) preclude, (2) be prioritized 
over, or (3) be protected from interference by external mandatory 
legal forces.  This theory advocates for the protected application of 
informal norms—as opposed to state or federal law—in the 
criminal context for certain close-knit communities.  The theorized 
result is that such close-knit groups whose informal norms are 
protected from interference by exogenous law will better maximize 
aggregate welfare, increase efficiency in member interactions, and 
reduce criminal conduct.  To use my own terminology, the 
preclusion of Custers allows informal norms to operate, thereby 
creating better outcome for both members of the close-knit 
community (by curtailing Texans) and outsiders. 
Part I explains Ellickson’s theory and analyzes other 
important contributions made by other scholars.  I highlight key 
components of Ellickson’s assessment concerning the close-knit 
community’s ability to both define and maximize welfare 
according to its sui generis values.  Part II discusses the taxonomy 
of historical and current examples of communities utilizing 
informal norms, or private law based mechanisms, to resolve 
disputes and how efficient results that maximize welfare (as 
defined by the community) are achieved.  Part III, addresses the 
question of whether government law enforcement interferes with 
the close-knit community to an extent great enough to diminish 
the efficacy, or existence, of operative informal norms.  By 
analyzing scholarship on community policing, I explain that while 
advocates of community policing and informal norms share similar 
goals, community policing is fundamentally adverse to—and 
hinders—the operation of informal norms. 
Part IV examines anthropological sources to argue that the 
unique attributes of various Indian tribes and tribal communities 
warrant definition as the type of close-knit communities 
contemplated under Ellickson’s theory.  Part V explains why the 
informal norms of certain tribal communities should be allowed to 
 
Scholarship, 93 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 467, 469 (2003). 
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operate without interference from outside legal forces (Custers).  
To set up this section, a historical and present day analysis of 
criminal law and jurisdiction in the context of Federal Indian Law 
is necessary.  I examine the background of criminal jurisdiction in 
Indian Country, the history of Tribal-State relations, and the 
resulting fragmentation of criminal jurisdictional authority 
between the federal government, tribal governments, and state 
governments.  I focus on a particular anomaly in Federal Indian 
Law, where Indian tribes in certain states are subject to State 
criminal jurisdiction, as opposed to Federal criminal jurisdiction.  
The consequences of this anomaly in tribal communities are 
described through a review of statistics and an analysis of recent 
empirical scholarship of the on-the-ground situation for these 
certain tribal communities. 
Finally, Part VI looks at the relevant provisions in the 
recently passed Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010 and asks 
whether they effectively address the criminal justice issues facing 
Indian tribes subject to State criminal jurisdiction.  I propose an 
alternative way of thinking about the problem of crime in these 
areas of Indian Country based on the theory that close-knit tribal 
groups are better situated to curtail crime and maximize 
community welfare through application of informal norms rather 
than through the mandatory imposition of exogenous law. 
I.  ORDER WITHOUT LAW: INFORMAL NORMS IN CLOSE-KNIT 
COMMUNITIES 
Clearly defining the terminology used in this article is 
important.  This article focuses on the distinction between a “law” 
and an “informal norm.”  Both are “rules,” but very different types.  
Ellickson’s theory sets forth certain types of controllers that create 
rules affecting human behavior: first-party, second-party, and 
third-party.17 
Rules originating from first-party controllers are called 
personal ethics and are enforced by the individual’s own personal 
reflections.18  Second-party controllers are other individuals who 
have a direct relationship with the conduct of another person.  For 
example, in a contract, the promisee has the ability to compel—
 
 17.  ELLICKSON, supra note 1, at 130–31. 
 18.  Id. at 126. 
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through rewards and punishments—the promisor to conform his 
conduct to the terms of the contract.19  There is a specific and 
direct relationship between the actor and the controller. 
Ellickson’s (and my) inquiry focuses on two types of third-
party controller created rules. Third-party controllers are 
subdivided into three types:  (1) Social Forces, (2) Organizations, 
and (3) Government.20  As Ellickson wrote, “[t]hird-party control 
differs from second-party control in that the rules are ones to 
which the actor may not have agreed; in addition the sanctions 
may be administered by persons not involved in the primary 
interaction.”21  Ellickson’s examined two specific types of third-
party controllers, Social Forces and Government, and also the 
rules that they each create.22  While both types of third-party 
controllers provide rules of behavior, they are distinct in two 
primary ways.  Social Forces are controllers that are non-
hierarchical and unaffiliated with the State.23  Government, on 
the other hand, is hierarchical and is the State.24  Rules 
emanating from Social Forces are called “norms” or informal 
norms.25  The rules created by Government are “laws.”26 
With these terms set out, recall Ellickson’s goal to examine 
the Coase Theorem in a real-world perspective.  The Coase 
Theorem suggests that “law” will not dictate the behavior of the 
parties, instead, the parties will bargain to an efficient outcome 
regardless of where the law places property entitlements.27  Coase 
did not discuss informal norms.  This is Ellickson’s important 
contribution stemming from his real world test of the Coast 
Theorem.  In essence, Ellickson confirmed the outcome of the 
Coast Theorem—that law does not dictate the choices and 
behavior of individuals under certain circumstances.28 
Ellickson hypothesized that “members of a close-knit group 
develop and maintain norms whose content serves to maximize 
 
 19.  Id. at 126–27. 
 20.  Id. at 131. 
 21.  Id. at 127. 
 22.  Id. at 127–28. 
 23.  Id. at 127. 
 24.  Id. 
 25.  Id. 
 26.  Id. 
 27.  Id. at 2. 
 28.  Id. at 4. 
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the aggregate welfare that members obtain in their workaday 
affairs with one another.”29  In other words, under certain 
conditions informal norms are more efficient in maximizing 
welfare than their exogenous law counterparts.30  This is why 
Order Without Law has been so influential.  Not only does 
Ellickson’s work validate, in a sense, Coase’s Theorem under 
certain conditions, but it also provides an additional basis for 
explaining why individuals cooperate: informal norms.31 
At the same time, Ellickson identifies “words of caution.”32  
He reiterates that his theory is plainly inapplicable to non-close-
knit groups.33  In addition, he points out that maximizing the 
aggregate welfare of a close-knit group may serve to harm or 
punish outsiders, including the examples of racial segregation and 
Jim Crow laws as evidence of this.34  Finally, he notes that simply 
maximizing the aggregate welfare of the close-knit group may not 
be the sole and ultimate goal for the group.  He suggests that the 
protection of fundamental civil liberties or other concerns may 
trump informal norms that would result in maximum aggregate 
welfare.35 
Bearing those concerns in mind, Ellickson’s work contains 
three key concepts that must be clearly laid out: “welfare,” 
“workaday affairs,” and “close-knit group.”  Ellickson uses the 
term “welfare” to include tangible and intangible benefits; in 
particular he cautions that the term is not simply reducible to 
wealth or money.36  As examples, Ellickson notes that welfare 
“refers to all things and conditions that people value.”37  Market 
prices are a way to measure value for those things traded in the 
open market, albeit a crude one.38  However, intangible things 
with value cannot be measured because they are not openly 
traded, e.g. friendship.39  Under these circumstances, where there 
 
 29.  Id. at 167. 
 30.  See id. 
 31.  See id. 
 32.  Id. at 169. 
 33.  Id. 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  Id. at 169–70. 
 36.  Id. at 168. 
 37.  Id. 
 38.  Id. at 171. 
 39.  Id. 
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are a mixture of things and conditions susceptible to both objective 
and subjective measures of value, “patterns of social exchange . . . 
can help reveal how people value outcomes reached outside the 
marketplace.”40  The close-knit social group and its members 
determine the relative values of intangible things and conditions.  
In essence, welfare is defined by the community through its 
operations. 
What are “workaday affairs?” Workaday affairs are those 
interactions between the members of the close-knit group that 
pertain to their common situation, i.e. that which creates the 
close-knit group.  In Shasta County, the workaday affairs arose 
among the close-knit group of cattle ranchers. They were all 
engaged in the same business and interacted with each other 
daily.  The workaday affairs governed by informal norms are those 
that are “ordinary matters” conducted on the stage set by “ground 
rules.”41 The ground rules contemplated by Ellickson are 
foundational rules like a concept of private property—under either 
a Lockean Labor Theory or a communal theory.42 These 
foundational rules are what allow the close-knit group to engage 
in voluntary exchange with one another: they allow for the 
community members to assign value to things and conditions.  
Thus, Ellickson’s theory of welfare-maximizing informal norms 
presumes the existence of foundational rules. 
Finally, the close-knit group has a very specific definition.  
Moreover, it is a central focus in the theory set forth below.  Close-
knit groups are not simply those individuals who maintain 
common connections, interests, or traits.  Instead, Ellickson states 
that a close-knit group is one where “informal power is broadly 
distributed among group members and the information pertinent 
to informal control circulates easily among them.”43 
There are two primary components that condition the 
existence of a close-knit group and determine the degree of “close-
knitedness”:  (1) reciprocal power to administer sanctions and 
benefits is completely distributed among members of the close-
knit group and (2) group member information about the past and 
 
 40.  Id. at 172. 
 41.  Id. at 176. 
 42.  Id. at 174. 
 43.  Id. at 177–78. 
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present.44 
First, the ability to administer sanctions in the future against 
other members of the close-knit group must be both widely 
distributed and readily deployable.45  Ellickson analogizes to the 
iterated version of the Prisoner’s Dilemma wherein each player 
has the same ability to apply sanctions or benefits.46  The repeat 
play aspect of the iterated game compels each player to think long 
term because there is a continuing relationship with the other 
player.  In addition, each player has recurring opportunities to 
exercise self-help power over the other.47  “When relations are 
continuing, an enforcer will receive more personal benefits if a 
particular sanctionee is induced to act more cooperatively in the 
future.”48 
Second, “repeat play by itself is insufficient to induce 
cooperation.”49  Members must have information about the 
current circumstances in order to “forecast” the consequences of 
their choice to exercise their reciprocal power of self-help.50  With 
regard to past information, a member needs this information in 
order to understand how other members of the group operated in 
prior instances.51 Historical information affects the member’s 
assessment of his future conduct by giving her an idea of the 
severity of previous conduct (cooperative or uncooperative).52  
Without historical data, the individual is operating in a vacuum 
with no baseline for determining what type of conduct is expected 
and the seriousness of deviation from that expectation.  It bears 
directly on her election to exercise, or withhold, her reciprocal 
power. 
With these terms defined, Ellickson’s theory finds that within 
a close-knit group, the informal norms created among those 
members will maximize welfare for the aggregate group, 
pertaining to their workaday affairs.53 
 
 44.  Id. at 177–80. 
 45.  Id. at 178–79. 
 46.  Id. 
 47.  Id. 
 48.  Id. at 180. 
 49.  Id. 
 50.  Id. 
 51.  Id. 
 52.  Id. 
 53.  Id. at 181. 
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II. PRIVATE LEGAL MECHANISMS 
By no means does Ellickson’s theory represent the entirety of 
the “norms school of thought.”  Professor Richman has skillfully 
identified important distinguishing factors of types of informal 
norms.54  His article creates a taxonomy for informal norms based 
systems—or private ordering.55  Richman shares at least one view 
with Weisberg, scholars writing about informal norms often do so 
with imprecision.56  Consequently, Richman adds structure to 
scholarly work on non-public law mechanisms for dispute 
resolution.57  Richman divides extralegal mechanisms into two 
groups: “those operating in the ‘shadow of the law’ and those that 
create ‘order without law.’”58 
The growing fascination in the legal academic community 
likely traces its roots to Stewart Macaulay’s 1963 scholarship on 
the analysis of the informal norms among businesspeople that 
resolve disputes without resorting to legal mechanisms.59  Fifty 
years later, academics remain intrigued, and perhaps befuddled, 
by the operational relevance of informal norms.  By defining 
terms, Richman attempts to bring a degree of clarity to the 
continuing discussion of informal norms in legal scholarship. 
Richman identifies a fundamental beneficial feature of public 
law based dispute resolution: availability among parties.60  Public 
law courts can enforce rules, agreements, and resolve disputes 
among perfect strangers; whereas informal norms are likely 
ineffective under such social circumstances.61  Systems of private 
ordering can operate either in the “shadow of the law” or operate 
to create “order without law.”  In a shadow of law base system, the 
parties’ respective assessments of their positions are 
fundamentally informed by their knowledge of how a public law 
 
 54.  See generally Richman, supra note 15, at 739. 
 55.  Id. at 740. 
 56.  Id. at 741–42. 
 57.  Id. at 743–44. 
 58.  Id. 
 59.  Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A 
Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 55, 61 (1963) (“Disputes are frequently 
settled without reference to the contract or potential or actual legal 
sanctions.”). 
 60.  Richman, supra note 15, at 743. 
 61.  Id. 
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court would likely resolve their dispute.62  The parties have a 
reasonably accurate view of their legal rights—something that 
entirely relies upon the existence, operation, and use of public law 
courts rendering relevant decisions.  Without the public law 
court’s enforcement of similar disputes, a shadow of law system 
simply cannot exist.63  Shadow of law systems arise among well-
informed parties as a way to resolve disputes, through 
cooperation, in a quicker and less expensive manner than that 
created by public law courts.64  Arbitration is a formalized version 
of such systems; indeed, public law courts readily enforce 
arbitration agreements and defer to the arbitrators’ decision so 
long as it “draws its essence from the contract.”65  Richman 
summarizes shadow of law systems by stating that “ . . . once legal 
entitlements are clearly defined, parties can economize on 
litigation costs and reach agreements through Coasean 
bargaining.  So long as the law’s shadow is well defined, parties 
can engage in mutually valuable conduct without assuming the 
costs inherent in state-made legal procedures.”66 
Order without law systems are distinct.  Owing to Ellickson’s 
work, Richman characterizes this system as involving “a much 
more categorical rejection of state law and state institutions.”67  
The creation and enforcement of informal norms comes purely 
from the community, “they are an alternative to, not an extension 
of, formal legal sanctions.”68  Enforcement mechanisms in order 
without law systems vary greatly and are sui generis to the 
particular community in which the informal norms exist.  
Sanctions can result in economic or social, or both, harm to an 
individual deviating from an informal norm.  Richman notes that 
order without law systems often arise under circumstances where 
reliable public law courts are unavailable to parties, therefore 
creating a need for consistent and equitable exercise and 
 
 62.  See id. at 744. 
 63.  See id. at 744–45. 
 64.  See id. 
 65.  Richman, supra note 15, at 745–46; MyLinda K. Sims & Richard A. 
Bales, Much Ado About Nothing:  The Future of Manifest Disregard After 
Hall Street, 62 S.C. L. REV. 407, 409–11 (2010); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 
465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984) (declaring the national policy favors arbitration). 
 66.  Richman, supra note 15, at 745. 
 67.  Id. at 746. 
 68.  Id. at 747. 
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enforcement of informal rules.69 But, he correctly notes their 
continued existence into the present day, as depicted in Ellickson’s 
work in Shasta County.70 
Richman identifies some costs created by types of private 
order systems, whether they are shadow of law or order without 
law based.71  There are significant obstacles to entering such a 
community engaged in private ordering.  Would-be newcomers to 
such communities lack the reputational history that encourages 
long-term members of the community to deal with them.72  Pre-
existing members of the community are concerned that the 
newcomer will turn out to be a Texan, thereby requiring the 
community to engage in sanctioning behavior and the application 
of informal rules.73  It is simply easier, more efficient, and less 
costly for members of the community to continue to deal with 
other long-term members who have reputational good standing.  
There is risk involved in branching out, thereby potentially 
foreclosing entry into the community to anyone. 
This feeling of uneasiness from long-term members of the 
community is recognizable in the present day to anyone who has 
ever purchased anything online. Online merchants have 
reputational ratings.  On eBay, prior purchasers leave comments 
for individual sellers, allowing anyone to see whether prior 
transactions went smoothly.74 Negative comments represent 
reputational sanctions that may economically impair the seller in 
the future.75  This is punishment levied by private individuals 
without any regard to the law.  In a given auction, those sellers 
with checkered reputations may command only a reduced number 
of bidders on an item readily available by a number of other 
sellers.  The reduced bidders represent the risk aversion to a seller 
with subpar reputation, just as a newcomer will face greater 
scrutiny by long-term members in a given community.  Even in 
disparate communities, such as online auction sales, reputational 
sanctions carry weight and no public law court need enter the fray 
 
 69.  See id. at 747–49. 
 70.  See id. at 747–50. 
 71.  Id. at 758–59. 
 72.  Id. at 758. 
 73.  See id. 
 74.  How Feedback Works, EBAY (Mar. 4, 2013), http://pages.ebay. 
comhelp/feedback/howitworks.html.  
 75.  Id. 
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to alter patterns of behavior within the community. 
This paper is solely concerned with order without law 
systems.  Moreover, it utilizes the definitional structure created by 
Ellickson for the operation of informal norms only under certain 
criteria described in Part I.76  The next section moves from the 
commercial transactional context and examines how law and 
informal norms operate in the criminal context by analyzing the 
scholarship on community policing. 
III. INFORMAL NORMS AND CRIMINAL LAW 
Thus far, I have reviewed the operation of informal norms in 
commercial and transactional settings.  Is that the extent of their 
application?  The next section explores this question by examining 
the rise of community policing in the 1980s and its alterations in 
recent years.  Community policing represents an attempt at the 
best of both worlds: informal norms and public law.  Much of the 
scholarship on community policing uses the term “informal norms” 
to describe the purpose of policing and revision of law enforcement 
strategies.  Utilizing the definition created by Ellickson along with 
Richman’s taxonomy of private ordering, I argue that community 
policing is not executing informal norm based systems.  Instead, I 
argue that community policing fundamentally undermines the 
operation of informal norms and is simply a delegation of public 
law authority to private actors.   
The application of the “norms school” of thought to criminal 
law is not new.77  My contribution is to apply Richman’s structural 
taxonomy and ask whether community policing is really a system 
 
 76.  Supra Part I. 
 77.   See generally TRACEY L. MEARES & SAN M. KAHAN, URGENT TIMES: 
POLICING AND RIGHTS IN INNER-CITY COMMUNITIES (Beacon Press 1999) 
[hereinafter MEARES & KAHAN, URGENT TIMES]; Miriam Hechler Baer, 
Cooperation’s Cost, 88 WASH. U.L. REV. 903 (2011); Robert C. Ellickson, 
Controlling Chronic Misconduct in City Spaces:   of Panhandlers, Skid Rows, 
and Public-Space Zoning, 105 YALE L.J. 1165 (1996); Dan M. Kahan, 
Reciprocity, Collective Action, and Community Policing, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1513 
(2002) [hereinafter Kahan, Reciprocity]; Debra Livingston, Police Discretion 
and the Quality of Life in Public Places:   Courts, Communities, and the New 
Policing, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 551 (1997); Eric J. Miller, Putting the Practice 
into Theory, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 31 (2009); David Alan Sklansky, Police and 
Democracy, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1699 (2005); Robert Weisberg, Norms and Law: 
and the Norms of Criminal Law Scholarship, 93 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
467, 469 (2003). 
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of private ordering—either a shadow of law or order without law 
system.  To begin, it is essential to center the discussion and 
community policing can mean a lot of different things.  A review of 
recent scholarship on community policing is therefore necessary. 
Professors Dan Kahan and Tracey Meares are two of the most 
prominent writers on community policing and empirical data on 
crime.78  In 2002, Meares explained that community policing is 
ubiquitous and that “many police departments” employ some type 
of community policing in their enforcement.79  David Thacher 
wrote “community policing exhorts city police departments to 
forswear their autonomy and collaborate with practically 
everyone: community groups and institutions, property owners, 
agencies of city government, other police and security forces, 
elected officials, businesses, and so on.”80  Sarah Waldeck said 
that “the community policing moniker has been assigned to so 
many different initiatives, no brief summary” can describe it in 
detail.81  In a near tautology, community policing can be thought 
of as a general requirement for the police to partner, in some form, 
with the surrounding community.82  This is a shift away from the 
idea that police department needed to operate in isolation from 
political forces and “monopolize the task of crime control.”83  
Waldeck provides some examples of community policing theory in 
action, including permanent beat cops visible and accessible on 
the streets, community input regarding the type and priority of 
enforcement services received, and teaching community residents 
about how to protect themselves from becoming victims of crime 
 
 78.   See generally Kahan, Reciprocity, supra note 66; Dan M. Kahan & 
Tracey L. Meares, Foreward:  The Coming Crisis of Criminal Procedure, 86 
GEO. L.J. 1153 (1998) [hereinafter Kahan & Meares, Foreward]; Tracey 
Meares, Praying for Community Policing, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1593 (2002) 
[hereinafter Meares, Praying]; MEARES & KAHAN, URGENT TIMES, supra note 
77; Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan, Law and (Norms of) Order in the 
Inner City, 32 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 805, 806 (1998) [hereinafter Meares & 
Kahan, Inner City]. 
 79.  Meares, Praying, supra note 78, at 1593–94. 
 80.  David Thacher, Conflicting Values in Community Policing, 35 LAW & 
SOC’Y REV. 765 (2001). 
 81.  Sarah E. Waldeck, Cops, Community Policing, and the Social Norms 
Approach to Crime Control: Should One Make Us More Comfortable With 
Others?, 34 GA. L. REV. 1253, 1254 (2000). 
 82.  See id. 
 83.  See Thacher, supra note 80, at 765. 
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again in the future.84  For purposes of the “norms school,” 
Waldeck notes that police officers in a community policing model 
may be taught to try and identify “relationships between 
individual events and develop solutions to underlying problems.”85  
This comment directly concerns the convergence of informal 
norms theory and criminal law. 
Meares and Kahan have argued that individuals do not elect 
to violate the law in a vacuum; they are part of a community 
where other members’ decisions create norms to violate or not 
violate the law in their community.86  This point dovetails, to a 
general degree, with the conclusion of the Coase Theorem (law 
does not solely determine the outcome between private parties) 
and of Ellickson (parties in close-knit groups generate informal 
norms that maximize aggregate welfare with respect to workaday 
affairs).87  Despite the existence of a law preventing a certain 
behavior, a norm may nonetheless arise in a community that 
encourages (or at least does not discourage) an individual’s 
election to act otherwise. Meares and Kahan advocated for 
intervention by community policing utilizing strategies that 
reinforce positive norms, so-called order maintenance norms, the 
enforcement of which will promote norms that deter crime.88  This 
combats the pre-existing community norms of deviation from 
publicly-originated law, but applied via the community through 
apparently informal norms. 
Meares and Kahan recognize the potentially important role of 
informal norms in communities while also understanding that 
public law is not necessarily effective at conditioning behavior 
under certain circumstances.89  However, as Richman has noted, 
under certain shadow of law systems of private ordering, the law 
is influential in recommending behavior and sanctioning 
deviations by the community.90 Community policing, then, 
attempts to use the community as the vehicle through which 
public law is applied—albeit informed by the partnership in 
 
 84.  See Waldeck, supra note 81, at 1254. 
 85.  Id. 
 86.  See Meares & Kahan, Inner City, supra note 78, at 806. 
 87.  See ELLICKSON, supra note 1, at 2, 167. 
 88.  Meares & Kahan, Inner City, supra note 78, at 815–18. 
 89.  Id. 
 90.  See generally Richman, supra note 15. 
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existence between the police and the community.  It nonetheless is 
external to the community.  The norms which community policing 
seek to undermine are the informal norms of the community.  
Therefore, there is an inherent antagonistic relationship between 
the informal norms of the community and the public law based 
informal norms initiated by the community policing strategy and 
executed by various members of the community.  The norms 
imposed by community policing strategies are informal norms in 
sheep’s clothing.  Despite the cloaking of an informal norm, they 
are Custers. 
These are not community norms; they have not arisen 
organically.  They are fundamentally external and foreign to the 
community. Community policing strategies like this are alien 
solutions to internal problems.  Thacher provides a basis for 
understanding why these strategies might not succeed: 
Any complex society involves differentiation in terms of 
roles and values (Durkheim 1960; Walzer 1984), so every 
social institution pursues priorities separate from and 
potentially in conflict with the others.  Consequently, 
interorganizational partnerships bring together 
institutions committed to potentially incompatible 
priorities. The practitioners who manage these 
relationships will find themselves in contested normative 
terrain, pressured by conflicting social aims that had 
formerly been institutionally segregated. To be responsive 
to each institution, they must be centrally concerned with 
resolving the tensions among those conflicting values.91 
In other words, community policing efforts to cloak public law 
as informal norms may face an uphill battle from the outset.  
There are so many players and parties in a community with 
different values, ideas, and levels of commitment that community 
policing’s noble effort to curtail criminal conduct is foundationally 
impaired.  These observations are familiar because they are the 
converse of Ellickson’s definition of the close-knit group.92  Power 
and information are not broadly distributed among the members 
of the group. Therefore, informal norms will not maximize 
aggregate welfare on workaday affairs under these circumstances. 
 
 91.  Thacher, supra note 80, at 766. 
 92.  ELLICKSON, supra note 1, at 177. 
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Much of the scholarship on community policing focuses on 
inner-city or urban areas.  These communities perhaps do not 
meet the definition of a close-knit group set up by Ellickson—
where informal norms are at their zenith in terms of influence.  
Recall, close-knit groups must have an even distribution of 
reciprocal power to punish others and have accurate information 
about the past and present community.93  For example, power 
imbalances may exist in these inner-city and urban areas thereby 
removing the ability of one individual to levy punishment against 
another.  As a consequence, informal norms are significantly 
weaker in their ability to condition an individual’s behavior.  We 
do not know enough about these communities in order to 
determine whether they are close-knit in the Ellicksonian sense. 
In other words, community policing is not a system of private 
ordering.  It is best understood as a delegation of public law 
authority and rules to private actors.94  These private actors may 
enforce these rules—and perhaps more efficiently than their 
public law police officer counterparts—but the rules enforced are 
not the informal norms of the community.  By definition, they 
originated from an exogenous source, rather than organically from 
within.  At this point, these rules bear little resemblance to those 
theorized by Ellickson. 
Again, my focus here is not to explain the failure or success of 
these types of community policing efforts in communities (close-
knit or not).  Instead, I focus on the application of the Richman 
taxonomy and Ellickson definition in order to provide specificity to 
the application of informal norms to criminal conduct under 
certain conditions, i.e. close-knit groups.  Therefore, my argument 
does not concern those communities that lack close-knittedness.  
Instead, I argue that informal norms should regulate criminal 
conduct—without interference by public law enforcement—where 
the community displays a high degree of cohesion and is extremely 
close-knit. 
A final and important point is that community policing may 
preclude the creation of close-knit group informal norms, which 
may maximize aggregate welfare for the community.  For 
 
 93.  See id. 
 94.  DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER 
IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 123 (Univ. of Chicago Press 2001). 
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example, the imposition of beat cops working the streets signals a 
greater presence of law enforcement from an outside entity.  When 
that entity enforces public law to curtail behavior, community 
members identify public law as the authority, thereby 
undermining the creation, efficacy, and operation of informal 
norms in the community.  As described above by Meares and 
Kahan, this is perhaps the point of community policy—to correct 
informal norms in the community that encourage individuals to 
break the law.95  But, community policing will also crush those 
informal norms with positive effects on the community because it 
fundamentally impairs the close-knit group’s development of 
informal norms.  Order maintenance rules do not select which 
norms to undermine, they operate to replace the existing norms 
and create new ones.  The enlistment of non-state actors and 
development of crime control partnerships with community 
institutions and private entities may well reduce crime rates and 
result in healthier, safer communities which are not close-knit.  
Community policing may have the unintended consequences of 
suppressing the creation of positive informal norms. 
IV. TRIBES AS CLOSE-KNIT COMMUNITIES 
Recall that Ellickson’s definition of a close-knit group requires 
that all of the group’s members be able to exercise reciprocal 
power of self-help, i.e. sanction the conduct of another member 
and that all members have information about the past and 
present.96  He states that his theory of informal norms simply 
does not apply to transient communities.97  Of course, certain 
communities are more close-knit than others.  I suggest an 
addition, or refinement, of this qualification that the more isolated 
the community, the higher the degree of cohesion will be among 
members.  This is not new; Ellickson implies as much in a footnote 
when he suggests that remote island communities may operate 
without a criminal justice system.98 
Ellickson warns against construing the definition of close-knit 
as a proxy for the characteristic that a group may be small.99  
 
 95.  Meares & Kahan, Inner City, supra note 78, at 815–18. 
 96.  See ELLICKSON, supra note 1, at 177–80. 
 97.  Id. at 169. 
 98.  Id. at 178 n.38. 
 99.  Id. at 182. 
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While a group’s small size may concentrate the degree of close-
knittedness, thereby making both the enforcement of norms and 
the ability to obtain information about the past and present 
easier, it is not a per se requirement.100  This section is dedicated 
to a brief examination of a certain community—Indian tribes—
and the extent to which they may qualify as Ellicksonian close-
knit groups along with unique features that may make them more 
likely to strongly enforce informal norms. 
Communities come in all shapes and sizes.  Those that are the 
source of legal academic inquiry in the context of informal norms 
are particularly colorful:  a Tuna Court,101 stand-up comedians,102 
diamond merchants,103 roller-derby participants,104 ranchers,105 
Wisconsin business owners,106 and now, a brief survey of certain 
Indian tribes.107  Professor Keith Basso describes in great detail 
the language, patterns of speech, culture, and importance of place 
to the tribal communities of Western Apache Indians.108  Basso 
 
 100.  Id.  
 101.  Eric A. Feldman, The Tuna Court:  Law and Norms in the World’s 
Premier Fish Market, 94 CAL. L. REV. 313 (2006). 
 102.  Dotan Oliar & Christopher Sprigman, There’s No Free Laugh 
(Anymore): The Emergence of Intellectual Property Norms and the 
Transformation of Stand Up Comedy, 94 VA. L. REV. 1787, 1790 (2008). 
 103.  Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal 
Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 
(1992). 
 104.  David Fagundes, Talk Derby to Me:  Intellectual Property Norms 
Governing Roller Derby Pseudonyms, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1093 (2012). 
 105.  See generally ELLICKSON, supra note 1. 
 106.  See generally Macaulay, supra note 59. 
 107.  This article looks only at certain tribal communities.  As an enrolled 
tribal member of the Chickasaw Nation of Oklahoma, I am constantly awed 
by the beautiful diversity of tribal communities.  My legal career has given 
me the opportunities to witness and interact with Indians in California, 
Massachusetts, South Dakota, Oklahoma, Arizona, New Mexico, Washington, 
Florida, and other places.  I cannot stress enough how different all of these 
communities are, and while there may be very broad generalities to be made 
among these distinct tribes, I must emphasize that each is its own nation, 
culture, and people.  This article explores the traits in certain tribal 
communities, and I make no claim regarding the presence or absence of these 
traits in other tribal communities.  It may be likely, perhaps very likely, that 
other tribal communities have the same or similar traits.  But such a claim 
would require additional study and support beyond the scope of this article.  
 108.  See generally KEITH H. BASSO, WISDOM SITS IN PLACES:  LANDSCAPE 
AND LANGUAGE AMONG THE WESTERN APACHE (Univ. of N.M. Press 1996).  
There are many federally recognized Indian tribes that are Western Apache.  
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attempts to explain the fundamental philosophical and 
cosmological distinctions of Western Apache thought: 
Staying away from places is something that Western 
Apaches would not recommend, and . . . they are not 
alone.  Vine Deloria, Jr. (Standing Rock Sioux), has 
observed, most American Indian tribes embrace “spatial 
conceptions of history” in which places and their names—
and all that these may symbolize—are accorded central 
importance.  For Indian men and women, the past lies 
embedded in the features of the earth . . . which together 
endow their lands with multiple forms of significance that 
reach into their lives and shape the ways they think.  
Knowledge of place is therefore closely linked to 
knowledge of the self, to grasping one’s position in the 
larger scheme of things, including one’s own community, 
and to securing a confident sense of who one is as a 
person.109 
Basso attempts to express the importance of place and the 
equally important idea that this is connected to the cohesion and 
identity of the community.  He continues, “[t]he [Western Apache] 
sense of place, their sense of tribal past, and their vibrant sense of 
themselves are inseparably intertwined. Their identity has 
persisted.”110  Basso then allows the people of Cibecue, Western 
Apache individuals, to share their experiences; one said: 
I think of the mountain called . . . (White Rocks Lie Above 
In A Compact Cluster) as if it were my maternal 
grandmother. I recall stories of how it once was at that 
mountain.  The stories told to me were like arrows.  
Elsewhere, hearing that mountain’s name, I see it.  Its 
name is like a picture.  Stories go to work on you like 
arrows.  Stories make you live right.  Stories make you 
replace yourself. 
 —Benson Lewis, age 64, 1979.111 
 
Professor Basso’s work focused on a region of Western Apache people, 
Cibecue, located on the Fort Apache Reservation—home of the White 
Mountain Apache Nation. 
 109.  Id. at 34. 
 110.  Id. at 35. 
 111.  Id. at 38. 
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One time I went to L.A., training for mechanic.  It was no 
good, sure no good.  I start drinking, hang around bars all 
the time.  I start getting into trouble with my wife, fight 
sometimes with her.  It was bad.  I forget about this 
country here around Cibecue.  I forget all the names and 
stories.  I don’t hear them in my mind anymore.  I forget 
how to live right, forget how to be strong. 
 —Wilson Lavender, age 52, 1975.112 
Basso then states the obvious: the difficulty in interpreting 
these statements arises due to their origination from an 
“experience in a culturally constituted world of objects and events 
with which most of us are unfamiliar.”113  Here, Basso’s point 
about outsiders being unable to comprehend the simple 
statements of these individuals resonates in the context of 
informal norms and law.  Informal norms are sui generis by 
definition.114  Ellickson’s point was that the close-knit group 
makes collective determinations about the relative value of things 
and conditions, that which makes up the aggregate welfare.115  
The informal norms are organized, through cooperation, in order 
to maximize the aggregate welfare of the community with respect 
to the workaday affairs of the members. 
The Western Apache have a definition of welfare based on 
their place, the stories, and the events that make and have made 
them who they are.116  As Basso said, it is their identity.117  
Therefore, one might say that the substance of the Western 
Apache informal norm is to maintain Western Apache identity.118  
Forgetting the stories is something Western Apache are not 
supposed to do.119  Leaving their place is “not recommended.”120  
Both amount to a rejection of Western Apache identity.121  These 
are the substantive informal norms of the Western Apache: to 
 
 112.  Id. at 39. 
 113.  Id. 
 114.  Id. 
 115.  ELLICKSON, supra note 1, at 181. 
 116.  BASSO, supra note 108, at 34.   
 117.  Id. at 35. 
 118.  See generally BASSO, supra note 108. 
 119.  See id. 
 120.  Id. 
 121.  Id. 
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respect and honor their identity.122 
Basso goes on to  further describe the language and speech 
patterns of Western Apache.123  He provides a description of the 
types of stories that Western Apache tell.124  He notes that these 
stories belong to all Western Apache.125  They are not localized in 
particular people with authority in the community.  All in the 
community, if they have heard, may tell them.  Basso explains 
that members of the Western Apache understand the cultural 
context in which these stories are to be told, because each type has 
an identifiable purpose.126 
Relevant for this article, there are stories that are told to 
condition behavior.  Much literature describes the sanctions of 
informal norms in the context of reputation and gossip.  For 
Western Apache, the sanctions are carried out through the 
reminders of who they are as a people, what their identity is, and 
the important role that each Western Apache plays in maintaining 
that identity as a tribal community.127 Basso closely studied 
Western Apache storytelling, 
which holds that oral narratives have the power to 
establish enduring bonds between individuals and 
features of the natural landscape, and that as a direct 
consequences of such bonds, persons who have acted 
improperly will be moved to reflect critically on their 
misconduct and resolve to improve it.128 
While this could sound like the personal ethics in a system of 
first-party control, it misses the interconnectedness of the 
community, the stories themselves, and the cultural and 
geographic isolation of the tribal community.  There is no one else 
that understands these stories as they are to be understood in 
their cultural context.  One, not accustomed to hearing them, has 
no frame of reference, philosophically or geographically, thereby 
losing the concept of community in the narrative.  Basso goes on to 
 
 122.  Id. 
 123.  Id. at xi. 
 124.  Id. at 3. 
 125.  Id. 
 126.  Id. 
 127.  Id. at 40. 
 128.  Id. 
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say that these stories shape Apache conceptions of themselves.129  
This is not a fable designed to convey the importance of telling the 
truth; instead, these are stories that explain and express who they 
are as people and as a community.130 
 Basso identifies the major categories of Western Apache 
speech: ordinary talk, prayer, and narrative story.131  Narrative 
stories are further broken down into four types: myth, historical 
tale, saga, and gossip.132  Each type of story has different values, 
which “describe the objective that Apache narrators typically have 
in recounting them.”133  Myths are intended to enlighten and 
instruct.134  Historical tales attempt to criticize, warn, or “shoot 
arrows,” to use the Western Apache phrase.135  Sagas are for 
entertainment.136  Finally, gossip serves to inform and malign.137  
Basso deconstructs examples of each of these types of Western 
Apache story, but this article only utilizes Basso’s impressive work 
and categorization to demonstrate the complexity of the informal 
norms of Western Apache culture and the significant cultural and 
geographic isolation implicit in the informal norms.138 
The Western Apache clearly qualify under Ellickson’s 
definition of a close-knit group.139  The ability to condition wrong 
behavior is widely distributed among all Western Apache since all 
members can tell the stories to those who deviate from the 
substance norm of maintaining Western Apache identity.  In 
addition, the stories themselves convey some of the information 
about the past and the present that is required in order for 
members of a close-knit group to exercise the reciprocal power of 
self-help. 
The unique aspect of the Western Apache, and perhaps many 
other tribal communities, as compared to other groups meeting 
 
 129.  Id. at 40–41 
 130.  Id.  
 131.  Id. at 49.  The Western Apache spelling of these categories can be 
found at: BASSO, supra note 108, at 49. 
 132.  Id. 
 133.  Id. 
 134.  Id. 
 135.  Id. at 50. 
 136.  Id. 
 137.  Id. 
 138.  See generally BASSO, supra note 108. 
 139.  See ELLICKSON, supra note 1, at 181. 
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Ellickson’s definition is isolation.  Isolation can be conceived of in 
two senses:  (1) geographic and (2) cultural.  Close-knit groups 
that meet Ellickson’s definition of power and information, who 
also contain the trait of being isolated in either sense, are that 
much more susceptible to the operation of informal norms.  
Therefore, informal norms should be allowed to operate without 
the interference of external public law intervention.  For Indian 
Country, the operation of public law in tribal communities has 
been mandatory as opposed to the residents of Shasta County who 
may voluntarily opt to utilize public law in the context of a lawsuit 
for trespass and damages.140 
The next section explains how public law enforcement in 
Indian Country did not always exist, but now presents 
fundamental problems for tribal communities. 
V. CRIMINAL JURISDICTION IN INDIAN COUNTRY 
Crime in Indian Country is not new.  How this problem has 
been addressed has undergone sweeping legal changes since the 
formation of the United States.  In order to provide context for 
how the problem of crime should be addressed in close-knit tribal 
communities, and to properly locate the informal norms theory 
within the pre-existing public law framework, a survey of criminal 
jurisdiction in Indian Country is necessary.  Criminal jurisdiction 
in Indian Country is a complex area of federal Indian law and has 
generated a great deal of scholarly and empirical interest.  In 
addition, given Congress’ plenary power over Indian affairs, the 
prospect of legislative tinkering is omnipresent.141  This section 
provides a history of criminal jurisdiction in Indian Country, 
describes this evolution from preclusive operation of tribal 
informal norms to the imposition of exogenous mandatory public 
law. 
A.  Pre-Contact Tribal “Criminal Jurisdiction” 
Modern Federal Indian law recognizes Indian tribes as 
“domestic dependent nations,” a phrase coined by Chief Justice 
 
 140.  See generally Robert C. Ellickson, Controlling Chronic Misconduct in 
City Spaces:  of Panhandlers, Skid Rows, and Public-Space Zoning, 105 YALE 
L.J. 1165 (1996). 
 141.  See generally United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886). 
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John Marshall in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia.142  At best, the 
phrase “domestic dependent nation” is a term of art, ill defined if 
the phrase is left to be interpreted solely by reference to the words 
alone.143  At worst, it is in inherent conflict and a conundrum for 
jurists, legal advocates, tribal leaders, and non-Indians with 
interests in Indian Country.144  One thing is clear, Indian tribes 
maintain some degree of self-government.  A fundamental 
attribute of a community’s self-governing authority is the 
capability to make and enforce rules.  Indeed, the enforcement of 
these community specific concepts is a “fundamental expression of 
a community’s notion of justice.”145 
Since time immemorial, tribal communities have employed 
complex political structures to govern all aspects of the 
community.146 As with other communities with defined 
governmental processes, Indian tribes “initially had complete 
control to express community norms” regarding appropriate and 
disapproved conduct.147  As discussed in this article, even in the 
absence of defined governmental processes, order may arise 
without law.148 
B.  The Increasing Complexity of Criminal Jurisdiction in Indian 
Country 
Many scholars, including myself,149 have correctly 
 
 142.  Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 2 (1831). 
 143.  Philip P. Frickey, (Native) American Exceptionalism in Federal 
Public Law, 119 HARV. L. REV. 431, 437–38 (2005). 
 144.   See id. 
 145.   ROBERT ANDERSON, BETHANY BERGER, PHILIP FRICKEY & SARAH 
KRAKOFF, AMERICAN INDIAN LAW, CASES AND COMMENTARY 310–11 (West 2d 
ed. 2010). 
 146.   See SHARON O’BRIEN, AMERICAN INDIAN TRIBAL GOVERNMENTS 14–20 
(Univ. of Okla. Press, 1989). 
 147.   ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 145, at 311. 
 148.   ELLICKSON, supra note 1, at 169.  See also Bernstein, supra note 103 
(describing the extra legal dispute resolution process in the diamond 
industry); Fagundes, supra note 104 (describing informal norms to protect 
roller derby pseudonyms); Feldman, supra note 101 (describing a highly 
specialized extra legal court to resolve tuna market disputes); Oliar & 
Sprigman, supra note 102 (discussing informal norms and self help 
enforcement in the comedy industry).  
 149.   See generally Rebecca A. Hart & M. Alexander Lowther, Honoring 
Sovereignty: Aiding Tribal Efforts to Protect Native American Women from 
Domestic Violence, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 185 (2008) (clarifying the complexities 
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characterized the structure of criminal jurisdiction in Indian 
Country today as maze-like.150  This section summarizes the 
respective jurisdictional authority for tribes, States, and the 
federal government.  The history of criminal jurisdiction in Indian 
Country illustrates the drastic changes Congress and the 
Judiciary can have upon the on-the-ground circumstances of tribal 
communities. 
1.  Federal Jurisdiction 
The first federal foray into altering criminal jurisdiction 
among Indian tribes within their territories came as part of the 
Trade and Intercourse of 1790, which provided federal jurisdiction 
over acts by non-Indians against Indians which “would be 
punishable by the laws of [the] state or district . . . if the offense 
had been committed against a citizen or white inhabitant 
thereof.”151  Notably, this statute did not reach crimes committed 
by Indians.152 
In 1817, Congress again altered criminal jurisdiction in 
Indian Country by extending federal jurisdiction to crimes 
committed by “any Indian, or other person or persons.”153  This 
statute is now known as the Indian Country Crimes Act or the 
General Crimes Act.154  Codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1152, the ICCA 
states that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law, the general 
laws of the United States as to the punishment of offenses 
committed in any place within the sole and exclusive jurisdiction 
of the United States . . . shall extend to Indian country.”155  The 
1817 amendment contained two exceptions recognizing the 
 
involved in the system). 
 150. See MAZE OF INJUSTICE: THE FAILURE TO PROTECT INDIGENOUS WOMEN 
FROM SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN THE USA 8 (Amnesty International 2007); Robert 
N. Clinton, Criminal Jurisdiction over Indian Lands: A Journey through a 
Jurisdictional Maze, 18 ARIZ. L. REV. 503, 504, 575 (1976); Gideon Hart, A 
Crisis in Indian Country: An Analysis of the Tribal Law and Order Act of 
2010, 23 REGENT U. L. REV. 139, 149 (2010); Hart & Lowther, supra note 149, 
at 187. 
 151.  First Trade and Intercourse Act, 1 Stat. 137 (1790). 
 152.  See id. 
 153.  Act of Mar. 3, 1817, ch. 92, 3 Stat. 383 (codified as amended at 18 
U.S.C. § 1152 (2006)); see also United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 324 
(1978). 
 154.  Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 324. 
 155.  General Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (2006). 
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jurisdiction of tribal governments.156  First, it exempted crimes 
committed by one Indian against another Indian.157  Second, it 
precluded federal jurisdiction where it would violate treaty 
stipulations specifically providing for tribal jurisdiction.158 
Later, in 1854, Congress created a third exception for 
application of the ICCA where an Indian was punished by the 
local law of the Tribe.159  Two of these exceptions, for Indian-on-
Indian crime and the preclusive operation of Tribal law to punish 
an offender, are early examples of public law which expressly 
recognizes the existence of a tribal community with powers of self-
government.160  These are early expressions of law and policy that 
favor the operation of informal norms over the intervention by 
mandatory exogenous public law. 
Another limitation within the ICCA is that the crime must 
occur in “Indian country.”161 The phrase “Indian country” is 
defined at §1151 and includes (1) all land within the limits of any 
Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States 
Government, (2) dependent Indian communities, and (3) all Indian 
allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been 
extinguished.162  Federal criminal law is not comprehensive, and 
it does not include provisions for the variety of criminal conduct in 
the same way as state codes.163  To fill the gaps of the ICCA, 
Congress passed the Assimilative Crimes Act (ACA) in 1825, 
which covers “[a]ny lands reserved or acquired for the use of the 
United States, and under the exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction 
thereof.”164  The ACA further provides that whenever an 
individual in an area covered by the ACA 
is guilty of an act or omission which, although not made 
punishable by any enactment of Congress, would be 
 
 156.  Id. 
 157.  Id. 
 158.   General Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (2006); ANDERSON ET AL., 
supra note 145, at 312–13.  
 159.  Act of March 27, 1854, 10 Stat. 270 (codified as amended at 18 
U.S.C. § 1152 (2013)). 
 160.  General Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (2006). 
 161.  Id. 
 162.  18 U.S.C. § 1151(a)–(c) (2006); see also FELIX S. COHEN, COHEN’S 
HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 732 (2005). 
 163.  ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 145, at 313–14. 
 164.  18 U.S.C. § 13 (1996). 
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punishable if committed or omitted within the 
jurisdiction of the State, Territory, Possession, or District 
in which such place is situated, by the laws thereof in 
force at the time of such act or omission, shall be guilty of 
a like offense and subject to a like punishment.165 
The ICCA provided a limited basis for federal jurisdiction, but 
even with the ACA filling in gaps, federal jurisdiction within 
Indian Country remained narrow.166  This fact commanded 
national attention in the late 1880s culminating with two major 
events: the Supreme Court’s decision in Ex parte Crow Dog (also 
known as Kan-Gi-Shun-Ca) and Congress enacting the Major 
Crimes Act.167 
In Ex parte Crow Dog, the Supreme Court considered whether 
federal jurisdiction existed when one Indian murdered another 
Indian.168 Of course, the circumstance involving Indian-on-Indian 
crime was specifically exempted from federal jurisdiction in the 
Indian Country Crimes Act.169  A famous case in federal Indian 
law resulted. The facts of Crow Dog leading up to the murder 
show very strong political and social forces at work within the 
tribal community.170  Both Kan-Gi-Shun-Ca (Crow Dog) and Sinte 
Gleska (Spotted Tail) were members of the Brule Sioux Tribe 
located in present day South Dakota.171  Both men were respected 
leaders within the Brule Tribe, but the two fought with each other 
despite the appearance of mutual respect—Sinte Gleska appointed 
Kan-Gi-Shun-Ca as the chief of police twice in prior years.172  On 
August 5, 1881, Kan-Gi-Shun-Ca shot and killed Sinte Gleska.173  
The event was handled in accord with Brule Tribal rules and 
during a tribal council meeting the next day, tribal leaders 
ordered an end to the conflict by dispatching mediators to the 
 
 165.  Id. 
 166.  See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 145, at 313–14. 
 167.  Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2006); Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 
U.S. 556, 572 (1883). 
 168.  Crow Dog, 109 U.S. at 557. 
 169.  General Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (2006). 
 170.  See generally SIDNEY L. HARRING, CROW DOG'S CASE: AMERICAN 
INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY, TRIBAL LAW, AND UNITED STATES LAW IN THE 
NINETEENTH CENTURY (Frederick Hoxie & Neal Salisbury eds., 1994). 
 171.  Id.  
 172.  ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 145, at 93. 
 173.  Crow Dog, 109 U.S. at 557; HARRING, supra note 170, at 1, 108–09. 
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respective parties to ensure resolution.174  In addition to the 
mediation, the families engaged in traditional resolution.  In 
accord with Brule Tribal law, the family of Kan-Gi-Shun-Ca 
provided Sinte Gleska’s surviving family members with $600, 
eight horses, and one blanket.175 
Despite the tribal community’s resolution of this intra-tribal 
crime, Federal authorities promptly arrested Kan-Gi-Shun-Ca two 
days later at the direction of the Indian agent.176  Apparently, the 
Indian agent’s actions were not arbitrary; instead, they were part 
of an effort on behalf of the Indian Office—the precursor to the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs—to extend federal criminal jurisdiction 
in Indian Country.177  In 1883, the Supreme Court in Crow Dog 
ruled that federal jurisdiction was lacking because the ICCA 
contained an exception for crimes between Indians, and no other 
source conferred jurisdiction.178 
In response to Crow Dog, in 1885, Congress enacted the Major 
Crimes Act (“MCA”).179  The MCA specifically created federal 
jurisdiction over fourteen “major” felonies when committed by an 
Indian against Indians or non-Indians in Indian Country.180  A 
year later, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the 
MCA in United States v. Kagama.181  The Kagama Court could not 
find a specific constitutional provision that authorized Congress to 
enact a criminal code for Indian Country but it upheld the law 
nonetheless.182  The Court reasoned that “[t]he power of the 
general government over these remnants of a race once powerful, 
now weak and diminished in numbers . . . must exist in [the 
federal] government, because it never has existed anywhere 
else . . . because it has never been denied; and because it alone can 
enforce its laws on all tribes.”183  Thus, federal jurisdiction exists 
 
 174.   HARRING, supra note 170, at 110. 
 175.   See id. at 110, 104–05 (for more background on tribal law and 
custom). 
 176.   ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 145, at 93. 
 177.   Id. 
 178.   Crow Dog, 109 U.S. at 561–62, 572. 
 179.   Act of March 3, 1885, § 9, 23 Stat. 362. 
 180.   COHEN, supra note 162, at 743; United States v. Torres, 733 F.2d 
449, 453–54 (7th Cir. 1984). 
 181.   United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 385 (1886). 
 182.   Id. at 379–80, 385. 
 183.   Id. at 384–85.  Kagama is generally known to be the first case 
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today in an expanded form.  However, it is important to note that 
the existence of federal jurisdiction does not divest a tribe of 
concurrent jurisdiction over the same crimes. Instead, Congress 
retains the ability to adjust criminal jurisdiction in Indian 
Country to this day, something that plays a key role regarding the 
creation of state criminal jurisdiction over crimes occurring in 
Indian Country. 
2.  Tribal Jurisdiction 
Tribal jurisdiction in the pre-contact era was comprehensive 
and coextensive with a tribe’s territory.  Federal statutes, treaties, 
and the judge-made doctrine that the diminishment of tribal 
authority due to tribes’ “dependent status” have all chipped away 
at tribal criminal jurisdiction since the founding of the United 
States.184  However, federal statutes and case law simultaneously 
confirm the continuing capability of tribes, albeit limited, to 
exercise criminal jurisdiction over tribal members and territory. 
As described above, the ICCA contains an exception that 
precludes federal jurisdiction where a tribe has already punished 
the tribal member who committed the criminal act, thereby 
recognizing and deferring to a tribal community’s authority to 
punish wrongdoers.185  In addition, the MCA does not preclude the 
exercise of tribal criminal jurisdiction over an Indian who has 
committed a major crime sufficient to trigger federal jurisdiction.  
This principle is reflected in Talton v. Mayers, which ratified 
tribal criminal jurisdiction.186 
In Talton, the Supreme Court considered whether the Fifth 
Amendment grand jury and due process clauses applied to tribal 
courts exercising criminal jurisdiction over tribal members.187  
The Court reasoned that the powers of Indian tribes pre-date the 
formation of the Constitution and, therefore, cannot be 
constrained by its provisions unless specifically provided for by 
 
confirming the existence of plenary power—or creating such a thing.  Plenary 
power over Indian affairs is a concept of federal Indian law with its own 
scholarship, a summary of which is unnecessary in this article. 
 184.   United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 326 (1978); see generally 
COHEN, supra note 162, at 221–37. 
 185.   18 U.S.C. § 1152 (1996). 
 186.   See Talton v. Mayers, 163 U.S. 376 (1896). 
 187.   Id. at 376–77, 379. 
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later law.188  Nearly half a century later, the Supreme Court again 
considered the interaction between Tribal courts and the Fifth 
Amendment prohibition against Double Jeopardy.189 
In United States v. Wheeler, an Indian was convicted of a 
crime in both tribal and federal courts, and he later challenged the 
jurisdiction of the United States.190  In its decision, the Wheeler 
Court acknowledged the longstanding precedent that a tribe’s 
power to punish offenders was an important aspect of its retained 
sovereignty.191  Relying on Talton, the Court confirmed that a 
tribal prosecution does not preclude the existence of federal 
jurisdiction since the exercise of authority emanates from two 
separate sovereigns with two entirely different sources of 
power.192  Based on the decisions in Talton and Wheeler, and the 
express exemption in the ICCA, the existence of concurrent tribal 
authority to punish Indians for criminal conduct is confirmed.193  
However, the MCA is a narrow statute conferring federal 
jurisdiction for a select few serious felonies.194  When an Indian 
commits a crime not listed under the MCA against another Indian 
in Indian Country, the tribe exercises exclusive criminal 
jurisdiction over the Indian offender.195 
The Supreme Court has limited the criminal jurisdiction of 
tribal courts in one specific, and infamous case:  Oliphant v. 
Suquamish Indian Tribe.196  The issue n Oliphant was whether 
tribes could exercise criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians who 
commit a crime against an Indian within the tribe’s territory after 
two non-Indians entered the Suquamish Indian reservation in 
Washington State and proceeded to speed across the highway, 
collided with a tribal police vehicle, and were subsequently 
 
 188.   Id. at 384. 
 189.   United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978). 
 190.   Id. at 313. 
 191.   Id. at 328–29. 
 192.   Id. at 329–30. 
 193.   See General Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (2006); See Talton v. 
Mayers, 163 U.S. 376 (1896); See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 
(1978). 
 194.   Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2006) (listing the fourteen 
major felonies). 
 195.  Tribal Court Clearinghouse, http://www.tribal-institute.org/lists/ 
jurisdiction.htm (last visited Sept. 27, 2013). 
 196.   Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 191, 212 (1978). 
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arrested by tribal law enforcement.197 After being detained in 
tribal facilities, they filed writs of habeas corpus in federal district 
court.198  In Oliphant, the Court held that tribes lack the inherent 
authority to punish non-Indians and have not been delegated the 
federal authority to do so.199  The basis for the Court’s 
determination rested in part on the diminishment of tribal 
sovereignty by virtue of tribes’ dependent status.200 
In sum, tribes only have criminal jurisdiction over Indians.201  
Where the crime committed falls under the MCA, regardless of the 
ethnicity of the victim, the tribe exercises concurrent jurisdiction 
along with the federal government.202  However, if the crime 
committed is not listed under the MCA, federal jurisdiction is 
precluded by the ICCA exception, and tribal criminal jurisdiction 
is exclusive if the victim was Indian.203  If the victim was non-
Indian and the crime committed by the Indian is not an MCA-
listed crime, then federal jurisdiction is precluded only if the tribe 
has exercised criminal jurisdiction and prosecuted the 
individual.204 
3.  State Law Jurisdiction Pre-Public Law 280 
In general, the principle that states lack jurisdiction (both 
civil and criminal) in Indian Country is foundational in Federal 
Indian law.205 In addition, a multitude of both federal and state 
courts have considered whether states could exercise jurisdiction 
 
 197.   Id. at 194–95. 
 198.   Id. 
 199.   Id. at 208–10. 
 200.  See id. 
 201.   In Duro v. Reina, the Supreme Court determined that Indian tribes 
lack criminal jurisdiction of non-member Indians. 495 U.S. 676 (1990). For 
example, the Navajo Nation would lack jurisdiction over a member of the 
Cherokee Nation just as it lacked jurisdiction over a non-Indian.  Tribes were 
displeased with this decision and sought relief from Congress via a legislative 
fix.  Congress passed the so-called “Duro-fix” confirming the inherent tribal 
authority to assert criminal jurisdiction over all Indians—regardless of tribal 
citizenship.  The congressional authority to enact this legislation was 
challenged in United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004), where the Supreme 
Court upheld the Duro-fix. 
 202.  Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2006). 
 203.  General Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (2006). 
 204.  Tribal Court Clearinghouse, http://www.tribal-institute.org/lists/ 
jurisdiction.htm (last visited Sept. 27, 2013). 
 205.   Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 520 (1832). 
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over criminal conduct in Indian Country under the statutory 
structure governing federal criminal jurisdiction.206  Each decision 
has determined that absent an express grant of jurisdiction via 
statute, states lack criminal jurisdiction in Indian Country.207  
The lone exception to this general rule exists for the situation 
involving a crime committed in Indian Country between a non-
Indian perpetrator and a non-Indian victim.208  In United States v. 
McBratney, the Supreme Court determined that state jurisdiction 
exists in this limited case.209  The Court relied on the fact that the 
Indian tribe located where the crime occurred does not have a 
federally protected interest in the resolution of crime between 
non-Indians.210 
4.  Summary Chart 
As a way of shorthand, the above principles of jurisdiction are 
depicted below in a chart. 
 
Offender Victim Jurisdiction  
Non-Indian Non-Indian State Jurisdiction is 
exclusive of federal and 
tribal jurisdiction. 
Non-Indian Indian Federal Jurisdiction under 
18 U.S.C. § 1152 is 
exclusive of state and tribal 
jurisdiction. 
Indian Non-Indian  If listed in 18 U.S.C. § 
1153, there is federal 
jurisdiction, exclusive of 
the state, but probably 
not of the tribe. If the listed 
offense is not 
otherwise defined and 
punished by federal law 
applicable in the special 
maritime and territorial 
jurisdiction of the United 
States, state law is 
assimilated. If not listed in 
 
 206.   COHEN, supra note 162, at 754 n. 168. 
 207.   See Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 222 (1959); Langley v. Ryder, 778 
F.2d 1092, 1095–96 (5th Cir. 1985); State v. Spears, 647 A.2d 1054, 1062 
(Conn. App. Ct. 1994). 
 208.   United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621, 624 (1882). 
 209.   Id. 
 210.   Id. at 624. 
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18 U.S.C. § 1153, 
there is federal jurisdiction, 
exclusive of the state, 
but not of the tribe, under 
18 U.S.C. § 1152. If 
the offense is not defined 
and punished by a 
statute applicable within 
the special maritime and 
territorial jurisdiction of 
the United States, state 
law is assimilated under 18 
U.S.C. § 13. 
Indian  Indian  If the offense is listed in 18 
U.S.C. § 1153, there 
is federal jurisdiction, 
exclusive of the state, but 
probably not of the tribe. If 
the listed offense is 
not otherwise defined and 
punished by federal 
law applicable in the 
special maritime and 
territorial jurisdiction of 
the United States, state 
law is assimilated. See 
section 1153(b). If not 
listed in 18 U.S.C. § 1153, 
tribal jurisdiction is 
exclusive. 
Non-Indian Victimless State jurisdictions is 
exclusive, although federal 
jurisdiction may attach if 
an impact on individual 
Indian or tribal interest is 
clear. 
Indian Victimless There may be both federal 
and tribal jurisdiction.  
Figure 1-1. Carole Goldberg & Heather Valdez Singleton, Law Enforcement and 
Criminal Justice Under Public Law 280, 4, (2007), available at https: //www. ncjrs.gov 
/pdffiles1/nij/grants/222585.pdf.   
C.  Legal and Functional Gaps in Criminal Jurisdiction 
The fragmentation of authority for law enforcement 
responsibility, investigation of crimes, and prosecution of crimes 
creates two basic problems:  a legal gap and a functional gap. 
1.  The Legal Gap 
The legal gap exists where an individual can commit a crime 
which the state, federal, and tribal governments are unable to 
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address through law enforcement, investigation, and prosecution.  
Up until Congress passed Senate Bill S. 47, also known as the 
Reauthorization of the Violence Against Women Act, on February 
28, 2013,211 the most prominent example of this problem was in 
the area of domestic violence.212  Statistics indicate that over 
seventy percent of Indian woman who are the victim of domestic 
violence describe the perpetrator as being non-Indian.213  This 
immediately removes the ability of tribal law enforcement to 
intervene without a superseding cooperative agreement with the 
county law enforcement.214  What about the federal government?  
The MCA only confers jurisdiction upon the federal government 
for fourteen major crimes—none of which include domestic 
violence.215  Certainly if the injury sustained by the Native woman 
is severe enough, it may trigger federal jurisdiction under the 
MCA.216  Of course, based on Worcester, the State as a general 
matter has no ability to assert jurisdiction over crimes committed 
against an Indian on the reservation.217  This is the legal gap; 
among the various political entities, none of them clearly has the 
authority to arrest, investigate, prosecute, and punish the 
offender. 
 
 211.  S. 47 Bill Summary and Status Violence Against Women 
Reauthorization Act of 2013, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d113: 
s.47. 
 212.   See generally Amy Radon, Tribal Jurisdiction and Domestic 
Violence: The Need for Non-Indian Accountability on the Reservation, 37 U. 
MICH. J.L. REFORM 1275 (2004) (describing the prevalence and complexities of 
legal remedy for domestic violence on Indian reservations). 
 213.   Lawrence A. Greenfield & Steven K. Smith, American Indians and 
Crime, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE:  BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, 8 (1999), 
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/aic.pdfindex.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=387. 
 214.   See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 212 (1978). 
 215.   Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2006); Senate Bills 872, 1192, 
and 1763: Hearing Before the Comm. on Indian Affairs, 111th Cong. (Nov. 10, 
2011) (testimony of Thomas J. Perrelli Assoc. Att’y Gen.), http://www. 
justice.gov/ola/testimony/112-1/11-10-11-asg-perrelli-testimony-re-s-872,-s-
1192-and-s-1763.pdf; Gaylen L. Box, Crow Dog:  Tribal Soverignty & 
Criminal Jurisdiction in Indian Country, 50 ADVOC. 13, 15 (May 2007). 
 216.  18 U.S.C. § 1153. 
 217.   Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 561 (1832); see also Bethany R. 
Berger, Williams v. Lee and the Debate of Indian Equality, 109 MICH. L. REV. 
1463, 1506–09 (2011). 
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2.  Functional Gap 
The functional gap occurs when jurisdiction is available, yet, 
it goes unexercised.  In 2008, the Senate Committee on Indian 
Affairs held a hearing on the high percentage of United States 
Attorneys declining criminal cases arising in Indian Country.218  
The concern on the part of then Chairman Dorgan and others was 
that the United States Attorneys were declining these cases for 
the wrong reasons, and Chairman Dorgan sought more detailed 
information regarding the basis for declinations.219  The 
functional gap problem exists in federal, state, and tribal law 
enforcement contexts.  Concern over the federal government’s lack 
of accountability to tribal communities and insufficient resources 
are commonplace.220  Indeed, the recent judicial decision in Cole v. 
Oravec221 further illustrates this concern over the efficacy of 
exogenous law enforcement in Indian Country.  In Cole v. Oravec, 
an FBI agent was sued for failing to properly investigate the 
deaths of two Crow Indians on the Crow Reservation in 
Montana.222  The district court denied qualified immunity to the 
FBI agent and the Ninth Circuit affirmed, saying 
[t]he amended complaint also sufficiently alleges 
discriminatory motive.  It alleges that despite the fact 
that Bearcrane’s death was ruled a homicide, the non-
 
 218.  Examining Federal Declinations to Prosecute Crimes in Indian 
Country: Hearing Before Comm. on Indian Affairs, 110th Cong. 2-4 (Sept. 18, 
2008), http://www.indian.senate.gov/public/_files/September182008.pdf. 
 219.   Id. at 5. 
 220.   CAROLE GOLDBERG & HEATHER VALDEZ SINGLETON, LAW 
ENFORCEMENT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE UNDER PUBLIC LAW 280 33–34 (2007), 
available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/222585.pdf; see also 
Larry Echohawk, Child Sexual Abuse in Indian Country:  Is the Guardian 
Keeping in Mind the Seventh Generation?, 5 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 83, 
99 (2001-2002); Kevin Washburn, American Indians, Crime, and the Law, 
104 MICH. L. REV. 709, 733–34 (2006) [hereinafter Washburn, American 
Indians]; Kevin Washburn, Federal Criminal Law and Tribal Self-
Determination, 84 N.C. L. REV. 779, 827, 829–30 (2006). 
 221.  Cole v. Oravec, 465 Fed. Appx. 687, 688 (9th Cir. 2012); Matthew 
L.M. Fletcher, Ninth Circuit Allows Bivens Action agaisnt FBI Agent that 




 222.  Id. 
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Native American man admitted to shooting Bearcrane, 
and there was evidence negating the claim of self-defense, 
Oravec failed to properly investigate the case. Moreover, 
it alleges that Oravec consistently closed cases involving 
Indian victims without adequate investigation, and that 
he has been heard to make improper remarks about 
female Native American victims of sexual assault.223 
Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs Kevin Washburn 
identified the wide cultural divide that can exist between tribal 
communities and federal prosecutors as a reason for the existence 
of the functional gap.224  In addition, he notes the general absence 
of media attention—also referred to as “external motivations”—as 
a potential hindrance to active engagement on the part of federal 
prosecutors.225 Finally, it cannot be ignored that federal 
prosecutors are simply not located within tribal communities, 
thereby requiring them to travel hundreds of miles for one case.226  
These three components have led to wide criticism of federal 
prosecutors, as indicated by the 2008 Indian Affairs Committee 
Hearing, for the failure to allocate proper attention and resources 
to Indian Country cases.227 
The functional gap can be explained using the terminology set 
forth in this article.  The federal government is an outsider—a 
Custer.  The exercise of sanctioning by a Custer is not tied to the 
close-knit group’s definition of welfare, and it interferes with the 
creation of informal norms that maximize welfare in the aggregate 
regarding workaday affairs. It is inefficient in its operation and 
destructive in its ramifications. 
D.  Public Law 280 Changes the Legal Landscape in Six States 
1.  Origins of Passage 
A more problematic example of the imposition of public law by 
a Custer is illustrated by the operation of an obscure law referred 
to as Public Law 280.  Public Law 280 was enacted by Congress in 
 
 223.  Id. at 689. 
 224.  Washburn, American Indians, supra note 220, at 731–32. 
 225.  Id. 
 226.  Id. at 719. 
 227.  Id. 
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1953.228 The date is relevant in light of the dramatic shifts in 
federal policy towards tribal communities during the preceding 20 
years.  For context, in 1934, the Indian Reorganization Act (“IRA”) 
provided statutory recognition of Indian tribes as governments 
with rights of self-determination.229  At that time, the United 
States was developing policies to spur economic development to 
end the economic depression.  The IRA contained similar themes 
for Indian Country, but also put Native-specific policies in place 
that sought to strengthen tribal civilization specifically and 
cultural pluralism generally.230  At the heart of the IRA was the 
policy that Indian tribes are governmental units and may adapt 
on their own terms to modern times.231 
Soon thereafter, a policy reversal occurred in Congress. In 
1943, Congress released a study entitled “The Senate Survey of 
Conditions Among the Indians of the United States.”232  The 
report heavily criticized the IRA and the underlying policies of the 
approaches employed with regard to trust lands, the management 
of trust assets and lands, and the strengthening of the Federal-
tribal relationship.233  A similar House Report soon followed in 
1944 that recommended new measures to assimilate Indians into 
the larger American citizenry.234  These reports fed political forces 
that sought to unravel the protections of the IRA.  The stage was 
set to address the “problems” created by the IRA.235 
An important part of the assimilation policy was the 
voluntary relocation program, started in 1931, but fully 
implemented by the 1950s.236  The program placed Indians 
residing on a reservation in urban areas.237  The rationale was 
that sufficient resources did not exist to sustain reservation 
 
 228.   Pub. L. No. 83-280 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1162, 28 U.S.C. § 1360, 
25 U.S.C. §§ 1321–26 (1953)). 
 229.   Indian Reorganization Act, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984, (codified at 25 
U.S.C. §§ 461-79 (1934)). 
 230.   COHEN, supra note 162, at 84. 
 231.   Id. at 84–89. 
 232.   Survey of the Conditions of the Indians in the United States: 
Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Indians Affairs, S. Rep. No. 310, 78th 
Cong. (1943). 
 233.   COHEN, supra note 162, at 89. 
 234.   Id. at 90. 
 235.   Id. at 89–97. 
 236.   Id. at 92. 
 237.   Id. 
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economies large enough to accommodate the resident Indians 
looking for work.238  Therefore, the relocation of Indians from their 
reservation homes to urban areas became official federal policy.239 
This policy gained momentum in the early 1950s when Congress 
again took action.240 
On July 1, 1952, the House of Representatives passed a 
resolution seeking legislative proposals “designed to promote the 
earliest practicable termination of all federal supervision and 
control over Indians.”241  Soon thereafter, on August 1, 1953, 
Congress passed House Concurrent Resolution 108, which stated 
that Congress should “as rapidly as possible . . . make the Indians 
. . . subject to the same laws and entitled to the same privileges 
and responsibilities as are applicable to other citizens [and] to end 
their status as wards.”242  Public Law 280 is a direct expression of 
the dramatic policy shift away from strengthening tribal self-
determination towards assimilation of individual Indians and the 
consequent breakdown of tribal governing structures.243  This is a 
far cry from the early federal criminal statutes recognizing tribal 
community rules and sanctions and shielding them from 
interference from external public law enforcement. 
Five states (Nebraska, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Oregon, and 
California) were covered by the original 1953 law.244  They are 
referred to as the Public Law 280 “mandatory” states.245  In 1968, 
Congress amended Public Law 280 to allow for other states to 
“opt-in” and accept the transfer of jurisdiction from the federal 
government.246  However, the 1968 amendment conditioned this 
transfer upon tribal consent from the tribes located in the state 
seeking jurisdiction.247  States accepting the transfer of 
 
 238.   Id. 
 239.   Id. 
 240.   Id. 
 241.   H.R. Rep. No. 82-2503, 82d Cong. (1952). 
 242.   H.R. Con. Res. 108, 83d Cong. (1953). 
 243.  See Pub. L. No. 83-280 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1162, 28 U.S.C. § 
1360, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321–26 (1953)). 
 244.  Carole Goldberg & Duane Champagne, Is Public Law 280 Fit for the 
Twenty-First Century?  Some Data at Last, 38 CONN. L. REV. 697, 700 (2006). 
 245.  TRIBAL COURT CLEARINGHOUSE, http://www.tribal-institute.org/lists 
/pl280.htm (last visited Sept. 27, 2013). 
 246.  Goldberg, supra note 245, at 703–04. 
 247.  Id. 
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jurisdiction after this time are known as “optional states.”248  For 
comparative purposes, a chart is produced below to show where 
the jurisdiction has been transferred under Public Law 280. 
 
Offender Victim  Jurisdiction 
Non-Indian Non-Indian  State jurisdiction is 
exclusive of federal and 
tribal jurisdiction. 
Non-Indian Indian “Mandatory” state has 
jurisdiction exclusive of 
federal and tribal 
jurisdiction. “Option” 
state and federal 
government have 
jurisdiction. There is no 
tribal jurisdiction.  
Indian Non-Indian "Mandatory" state has 
jurisdiction exclusive of 
federal government but 
not necessarily of the 
tribe. "Option" state has 
concurrent jurisdiction 
with the federal courts. 
Indian  Indian "Mandatory" state has 
jurisdiction exclusive of 
federal government but 
not necessarily of the 
tribe. "Option" state has 
concurrent jurisdiction 
with tribal courts for all 
offenses, and concurrent 
jurisdiction with the 
federal courts for those 
listed 
in 18 U.S.C. § 1153. 
Non-Indian Victimless State jurisdiction is 
exclusive, although 
federal 
jurisdiction may attach in 
an option state if 
impact on individual 
Indian or tribal interest is 
clear. 
 
 248.  Ada Pecos Melton & Jerry Gardner, Public Law 280: Issues and 
Concerns for Victims of Crime in Indian Country, AM. INDIAN DEV. ASSOC. 
(Oct. 4, 2013), http://www.aidainc.net/Publications/pl280.htm. 
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Indian Victimless There may be concurrent 
state, tribal, and in an 
option state, federal 
jurisdiction. There is no 
state 
regulatory jurisdiction. 
Figure 1-2. Carole Goldberg & Heather Valdez Singleton, Law Enforcement and 
Criminal Justice Under Public Law 280, 5, (2007), available at https: //www. 
ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/ grants/222585.pdf.   
2.  Initial Deficiencies of Public Law 280 
As originally passed, Public Law 280 was very simple. It 
transferred criminal jurisdiction over crimes committed in Indian 
Country from the federal government to five, and later six, 
states.249 States were tasked with daily enforcement of state law 
in Indian Country.250  Unfortunately, Public Law 280 failed to 
provide funding for states newly tasked with exercising criminal 
jurisdiction over potentially huge areas of land and thousands of 
Indian people. The lack of additional funding strained police 
forces, human resources, physical facilities, and the state criminal 
justice system as a whole.251 
Of course, the degree to which the states were overburdened 
is not ascertainable since Public Law 280 did not require, or 
provide funding for, funds to study the effect of Public Law 280 
upon state law enforcement efficacy, crime rates in Indian 
Country, or any other aspect of criminal justice.252  Just as there 
was no methodology in place to train law enforcement and prepare 
tribal communities for the imposition of state law enforcement, 
there was no attempt to address the easily foreseeable clashes and 
disputes between tribes and the state.  Essentially Congress, 
through Public Law 280, completely changed the rules between 
these two communities and then locked them in a room together to 
fight over the terms of their new relationship.  With states having 
the ultimate say in all things criminal jurisdiction, already 
 
 249.   The original five states were Nebraska, Oregon, Minnesota, 
Wisconsin, and California. Alaska was added later. TRIBAL COURT 
CLEARINGHOUSE, http://www.tribal-institute.org/lists/pl280.htm (last visited 
Sept. 27, 2013). 
 250.  Id.  
 251.  Goldberg, supra note 245, at 704.  
 252.  See Pub. L. No. 83-280 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1162, 28 U.S.C. § 
1360, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321–26 (1953)). 
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burdened by the unfunded mandate created by Public Law 280, it 
is understandable that states were uninterested in negotiating 
mutually acceptable solutions with Indian tribes.253  
Unfortunately, the unilateral nature of Public Law 280, the 
burden it placed on states, and the wholesale renunciation of 
fundamental principles of federal Indian law and tribal self-
determination created a volatile situation that has continued to 
the present day. 
3.  1968 Amendments 
In 1968, Congress amended Public Law 280 by requiring 
Indian tribes to consent to any new transfer of criminal 
jurisdiction from the federal government to the applicable state 
government.254  The amendments also authorized states currently 
exercising criminal jurisdiction over Indian Country pursuant to 
Public Law 280 to retrocede, or return, that jurisdiction to the 
federal government.255 
The new amendment, it is fair to say from the perspective of 
Indian tribes, stopped the loss of jurisdiction in Indian Country.256  
Even though the 1968 amendments allowed states to “opt in” to 
the Public Law 280 structure, they first had to obtain formal tribal 
consent from tribes located in the state.257  As Professor Goldberg 
has noted, since the 1968 amendments, no state has successfully 
obtained tribal consent for the transfer of jurisdiction to the state 
under Public Law 280 sending a clear message regarding the 
tribal view of Public Law 280.258 
4.  Public Law 280-like Statutes 
A number of other statutes similar to Public Law 280 have 
also been passed by Congress.259 Frequently, in these statutes, 
 
 253.  See Pub. L. No. 83-280 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1162, 28 U.S.C. § 
1360, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321–26 (1953)). 
 254.  Enacted as part of the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 25 U.S.C. § 
1321 (1968).  
 255.  While an important aspect of Public Law 280, retrocession is outside 
the scope of this article. 
 256.  See Enacted as part of the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 25 U.S.C. 
§ 1321 (1968). 
 257.  See id. 
 258.  GOLDBERG, supra note 221, at 7. 
 259.  See  25 U.S.C. §§ 1701–16 (1978) (R.I.); 25 U.S.C. § 1774 (1990) 
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Congress will recognize an Indian tribe or multiple tribes within a 
state and will simultaneously grant the state criminal jurisdiction 
over crimes occurring on the reservation regardless of the political 
affiliation of the perpetrator or victim, i.e. non-Indian or Indian.260  
In the West, Washington stands alone as perhaps the most 
complex state/tribal/federal criminal jurisdiction in the country.261  
While not a mandatory state under Public Law 280, the proposals 
to remedy the issues facing tribes in Public Law 280 states are 
equally applicable to those states subject to Public Law 280-like 
statutes. 
E.  Consequences of Public Law 280 
As discussed above, the imposition of mandatory public law 
enforcement from an exogenous source has significant negative 
ramifications for the informal norms of the close-knit community.  
It may not be the case that all tribal communities located in 
Public Law 280 states meet the definition of a close-knit group, 
but many will. Some empirical data exists, illustrating how these 
tribal communities have fared under Public Law 280.  This section 
describes the long-term effects created by Public Law 280 and 
assesses the present-day problems of Indian tribes in these states.  
In the context of the informal norms theory advanced here, these 
are the consequences of the imposition of exogenous law on a 
close-knit group, i.e. Custer effects. 
1. Long Term Effects of Public Law 280 
Halting the Development of Tribal Courts.  A small 
percentage of Indian tribes in Public Law 280 states have fully 
developed comprehensive tribal courts.  For example, of the 107 
federally recognized Indian tribes in California, only four have an 
existing tribal court of some sort.262  Many of these tribal courts 
are limited to exercising jurisdiction over Indian Child Welfare 
Act (“ICWA”) cases under the express authorization contained in 
 
(N.Y.); 25 U.S.C. § 1775 (1994) (Conn.); Wash. Rev. Code § 37.12.021 (1963). 
 260.  See 25 U.S.C. §§ 1721–35 (1980) (Me.); 25 U.S.C. §§ 1751–60 (1983) 
(Conn.); 25 U.S.C. § 941 (1993) (S.C.); 25 U.S.C. § 1771 (1987) (Mass.).   
 261.  GOLDBERG, supra note 221, at 10–11; see also Robert T. Anderson, 
Negotiating Jurisdiction: Retroceding State Authority Over Indian Country 
Granted by Public Law 280, 87 WASH. L. REV. 915 (2012). 
 262.  GOLDBERG, supra note 221, at 14. 
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ICWA.263  Tribes located in Public Law 280-mandatory states lag 
far beyond their non-Public Law 280 counterparts in terms of the 
development of tribal courts. 
Exacerbation of Tension Between State and Tribes.  
States and tribes are by default at odds with one another.264  The 
Supreme Court recognized this fact before the turn of the 19th 
century in Kagama by explaining that Indian tribes “owe no 
allegiance to the states, and receive from them no protection.  
Because of the local ill feeling, the people of the states where they 
are found are often their deadliest enemies.”265 Scholarship in this 
area from Professors Matthew Fletcher and Ezra Rosser describe 
the shifting viewpoints on tribal-state relations and the long-term 
and short-term benefits derived from negotiated peace in the form 
of cooperative agreements.266  Certainly, state and tribal interests 
occasionally dovetail and there are circumstances where they 
actually need one another in order to obtain funding or spur 
economic development in the area. Federal Indian Law, however, 
reflects an on-going conflict between Indians and non-Indians, 
Tribal communities and State governments.267 
In Worcester v. Georgia, the Supreme Court considered the 
validity of a Georgia law requiring non-Indians living within the 
boundaries of the Cherokee Nation to obtain a state license in 
order to reside there.268  The Court determined that the “Cherokee 
Nation . . . is a distinct community occupying its own territory, 
with boundaries accurately described, in which the laws of 
Georgia can have no force . . . ”269  The Court explained further 
that the Georgia state laws “ . . . interfere forcibly with the 
relations established between the United States and the Cherokee 
nation, the regulation of which, according to the settled principles 
 
 263.   Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-608, 93 Stat. 
3071(cofidied at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901–1963 (1978)). 
 264.   See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978); 
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832). 
 265.  United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384 (1886). 
 266.  See Ezra Rosser, Caution, Cooperative Agreements, the Actual State 
of Things: A Reply to Professor Fletcher, 42 TULSA L. REV. 57 (2007); Matthew 
L.M. Fletcher, Retiring the “Deadliest Enemies” Model of Tribal-State 
Relations, 43 TULSA L. REV. 73 (2007). 
 267.  See Rosser, supra note 267, at 65. 
 268.  Worcester, 31 U.S. at 537, 542. 
 269.  Id. at 561. 
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of our constitution, are committed exclusively to the government 
of the union.”270  What the Court did not say was that, obviously, 
the imposition of State law significantly interferes with tribal 
communities. 
Tribal independence stemming from Worcester created conflict 
with the states.271 This is seen as a limitation on state 
sovereignty, an affront to the self-determining nature of the 
several states, and something that inevitably provides fertile soil 
for conflict when tribes use their independence to their advantage.  
The situation is little different for tribes.  Tribes have been 
dealing with states for centuries, frequently seeking judicial 
intervention to mediate disputes and lobbying Congress for 
changes in federal law for the protection from state encroachment. 
Many tribes, both historically and presently, perceive a constant 
onslaught by state governments to infringe upon tribal territories, 
powers of self-determination, and tribal culture.  Tribal existence 
as “domestic dependent nations” creates the ambiguity necessary 
for Tribes and States to dispute who is more sovereign.272 
Specific Effects on Tribal Criminal Justice Systems. 
Public Law 280 has particularized negative effects on law 
enforcement in Indian Country. Public Law 280 lacked any 
expressed duty on behalf of the states to provide law enforcement 
and associated services to Indians, therefore, leaving tribal 
communities with no avenue for relief.273 
The development of tribal law enforcement in Public Law 280 
states trails far behind that of non-Public Law 280 counterpart 
tribal governments, and many lack law enforcement entirely.274  
Upon transfer of jurisdiction over Indian Country to the 
mandatory states, the federal attitude was that tribes had no need 
for their own law enforcement since the state would be enforcing 
its criminal laws in Indian Country.275  Public Law 280 presumed 
the states would fulfill the role of Custer:  impose daily and 
 
 270.  Id. 
 271.  See Fletcher, supra note 267, at 81. 
 272.  See The Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 2 (1831). 
 273.  See Pub. L. No. 83-280 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1162, 28 U.S.C. § 
1360, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321–26 (1953)). 
 274.  GOLDBERG, supra note 220, at 13–14. 
 275.  Goldberg & Champagne, supra note 244, at 702. 
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mandatory law enforcement for the tribal community.276  The 
“duty” to provide law enforcement services and prosecute criminal 
conduct occurring in Indian Country then rested with the state.277  
Tribal communities were subjected to state encroachment directed 
by Congress for the specific purpose of removing that attribute of 
tribal self-governance.278 
This was the fundamental policy of Public Law 280.  It comes 
as no surprise that roughly twenty-one percent of tribes in 
mandatory Public Law 280 states have their own law enforcement 
systems, compared with nearly seventy-five percent of tribes in 
non-Public Law 280 states.279  Only seven out of the 107 Indian 
tribes in California have tribally operated police departments.280  
The long-term effects of Public Law 280 are clear in this regard. 
These are practical and real world consequences of a Custer 
operating in a close-knit group, in addition to the fundamental 
problem that a Custer forecloses the creation and operation of 
informal norms. 
2. Opinions of Public Law 280 in Indian Country 
Despite Public Law 280 affecting only five states, tribes 
located in these states constitute forty percent of all the tribes in 
the lower forty-eight states.281  This statistic should make clear 
that Public Law 280 is a significant problem for a substantial 
portion of Indian Country. This fact has not resulted, 
unfortunately, in a wealth of statistical data on the specific issues 
in Public Law 280 states.  A recent report by leading scholar 
Professor Carole Goldberg sheds some light on this issue.282 
The Report specifically examined the effects of Public Law 
280 on tribes and hypothesized that “effective police and justice 
systems in Indian country depend on the degree of accountability 
of law enforcement and criminal justice to tribal populations, as 
well as the adequacy of resources to provide policing and court 
 
 276.  See id. 
 277.  Id. 
 278.  Id. 
 279.  GOLDBERG, supra note 220, at 14. 
 280.  Id. 
 281.  Id. 
 282.  See generally GOLDBERG, supra note 220. 
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services.”283 The Goldberg Report collected data from 350 
individuals including “reservation residents, law enforcement 
officials, and criminal justice personnel connected with seventeen 
different reservations, twelve of which are subject to state 
jurisdiction.”284  Findings relevant to this thesis advanced herein 
are explored below. 
Crime Rates.  The Report was unable to determine whether 
crime rates were higher in Public Law 280 states than non-Public 
Law 280 states due to insufficient data and the way data is 
undifferentiated by county law enforcement.285  A positive result 
of this study, despite the unavailability of data, is that some police 
departments have reoriented their data collection programs to 
differentiate between crime occurring in Indian Country versus 
crime occurring on non-Indian land.286 
Availability of Law Enforcement.  The study found that 
reservation residents of Public Law 280 states “report that state 
or county law enforcement is less available to them than tribal 
police” departments.287  For comparative purposes, Public Law 
280 reservation residents indicate “significantly less police 
availability” than counterparts in non-Public Law 280 
jurisdictions.288  Public Law 280 reservation resident complaints 
include slow response times, less effective patrolling services, and 
higher likelihood of declining service due to remoteness of 
location.289  The reason for these deficiencies, as described by 
reservation residents, include the perspective that crime in Indian 
country is of a lower priority, tension between the Indian and non-
Indian community, selective enforcement, and a lack of 
resources.290 
This is unsurprising if viewed through the lens of informal 
normative theory.  Members of a close-knit community will view 
the agent of exogenous law enforcement as a Custer.  Combined 
with the pre-existing and long-standing tensions between Tribes 
 
 283.   Id. at viii. 
 284.   Id. at 473. 
 285.   Id. at 474. 
 286.   Id. 
 287.   Id.  
 288.   Id. 
 289.   Id. 
 290.   Id. 
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and States, the Report’s findings are completely expected. 
Effective of Cooperative Agreements, Concurrent 
Jurisdiction.  The Report found that cooperative agreements 
“ameliorate, but do not solve, underlying problems of 
accountability and resources associated with Public Law 280.”291  
The Report found two general types of cooperative agreements:  
deputization agreements (allowing tribal police to enforce state 
law on the reservation) and law enforcement services agreements 
(“pay[ing] county police to provide enhanced services on the 
reservation”).292  The law applied remains foreign to the tribal 
community, ignorant of tribal norms, and largely unresponsive to 
the needs of the Indian community. 
Crime in Indian Country, especially violence against women, 
is at a point of crisis.  These types of cooperative agreements may 
provide short-term benefits in the reduction of the crime rate—
something we cannot show by data because adequate statistics do 
not exist to confirm such a hypothesis.  But, agreements of this 
type work to delay fundamental change regarding the recognition 
of tribal communities as valid.  They formalize, the role of the 
State as a Custer, albeit with the tribal community’s consent.  As 
a Custer, they have a lower interest in the health and well-being 
of the community because it is not their community.  
Furthermore, they lack the context in order to determine whether 
the close-knit group is healthy because they do not understand 
how the group defines welfare. 
In addition, the informal norms of the close-knit group are 
irrelevant to the Custer’s determination as to the sanctions to 
create, when to apply them, and how to apply them.  There is a 
chance that the sanctions orchestrated by the Custer will not 
resonate in the tribal community, thereby inefficiently addressing 
the needs of the tribal community.  At the same time, the Custer’s 
conduct precludes the development and operation of actual 
informal norms arising from the community.  Indeed, Professor 
Goldberg foreshadows the Oravec circumstance when she warns 
that “[c]ross-deputization agreements are not without their own 
problems, which can include . . . inadequate responses to 
reservation calls by the non-Indian agency, and fear or distrust 
 
 291.   Id. at 480. 
 292.   Id. 
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from the non-Indian community.”293 
Even if the state agrees to interface with the close-knit tribal 
community, it is still a Custer.  The imposition of public law will 
continue to undermine the creation, enforcement, and efficacy of 
informal norms within the tribal community.  At their best, 
cooperative agreements are simply a more specific type of 
community policing.  This paper argues for a reinvigoration of 
early federal principles recognizing the self-governing nature of 
tribal communities, especially where they are close-knit under 
Ellickson’s definition and encourage state and federal deference to 
those informal normative processes. 
VI. PRESENT AND ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS FOR PUBLIC LAW 280 IN 
INDIAN COUNTRY 
A Custer wreaks havoc on close-knit communities.  In the 
context of Indian Country, both the federal and state governments 
are Custers.  However, the effects of state Custers upon tribal 
communities is far worse than their federal counterparts.  
Primarily, this is because state law enforcement has day-to-day 
law enforcement responsibility, whereas the federal law 
enforcement in the FBI has only narrow jurisdictional authority. 
Tribal communities in Public Law 280 states are subjected to 
mandatory and unilateral imposition of external law, which 
prevents the meaningful development of informal norms that 
maximize aggregate welfare and better curtail Texans.  Present 
crime data does not allow us to determine the extent of these 
negative effects comparatively between Public Law 280 tribal 
communities and non-Public Law 280 tribal communities.  Even if 
that data were available, such information would not allow for a 
one-to-one comparison since tribal communities are simply not 
fungible.  Not all tribal communities are close-knit, however, and 
thus, that is where the inquiry should focus: how to assist those 
tribal communities that have those traits of close-knitedness. 
In 2010, Congress endeavored to address various problems in 
Indian Country criminal jurisdiction.294  Congress fundamentally 
changed Public Law 280 in the Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010 
 
 293.   Id. at 29. 
 294.  See Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-211, § 221, 
124 Stat. 2258 (2010). 
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(TLOA).295  Section 221 of the Act provides tribes in mandatory 
Public Law 280 states the opportunity to request the Attorney 
General of the United States to reassume criminal jurisdiction in 
Indian Country.296  Tribes may do this unilaterally without prior 
approval from the State.297 The determination to accept 
jurisdiction rests solely with the Department of Justice.298  In 
essence, Section 221 turns Public Law 280, the original 1953 
version, on its head by placing States in the former position of 
tribes as overlooked, ignored, and un-consulted entities. 
This policy change will be largely ineffective as the defects 
mirror those that caused the original failure of Public Law 280.  
First, it fails to provide funding to ensure that upon re-assumption 
of jurisdiction the federal government’s law enforcement agencies 
and the United States Attorney have adequate staff, resources, 
and means to properly investigate and prosecute criminal conduct.  
This is especially problematic in light of the current opinion that 
the federal presence in Indian Country criminal matters is 
insufficient.299  Second, there are no safeguards to guide an 
orderly transition from two sovereigns with concurrent 
jurisdiction to three.  Tension will still exist and it will likely 
increase.  Third, while the change in policy is normatively and 
legally preferable, it is relevant that states are being subject to the 
unilateral will of Indian tribes and the federal government.  
Preventing States from having a voice as to the allocation of 
responsibility among three sovereign entities simply compounds 
the problem and will almost certainly make any transitional 
period more difficult. 
The policy change, while welcome, is late; and it is impaired 
by the defects mentioned above.  While some tribal communities 
might benefit from this legislative change, close-knit tribal 
communities would benefit from legislation that protects the 
creation and operation of informal norms from Custers.  There is 
 
 295.  Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-211, § 221, 124 
Stat. 2258 (2010). 
 296.   Id. 
 297.   Id. 
 298.   Id. 
 299.   See, e.g., Examining Federal Declinations to Prosecute Crimes in 
Indian Country: Hearing before Comm. On Indian Affairs, 110th Cong. (Sept. 
18, 2008), http://www.indian.senate.gov/public/_files/September182008.pdf. 
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precedent for this policy in federal criminal law and the emerging 
scholarship from Richman and Ellickson provide an empirical 
basis for its codification. 
 
A.     Legally Recognized Informal Norms for Close-Knit Tribal 
Communities 
This article began with the archetypes of the Texan and the 
Custer. Informal norms solve the problem of the Texan but the 
presence of a Custer fundamentally impairs the creation and 
operation of informal norms.  Therefore, my theory calls for a 
structure that prevents the Custer from interfering until informal 
norms have attempted to remediate the Texan.  To put it 
differently, my theory argues for a principle like that found in 
administrative law which requires a plaintiff to exhaust 
administrative remedies before suing the agency in court. 
Indeed, the Shasta County community already operates in 
this way as described in Ellickson’s work.300  Cattle trespass law 
exists and creates legal rights between parties.301  Parties may 
avail themselves of their legal rights in court, but Ellickson’s point 
is that they rarely—if ever—do so because resolving the dispute 
by informal norms is more efficient and maximizes aggregate 
welfare in the community.302  To make Shasta County resemble 
the situation for tribal communities in Public Law 280 states, 
imagine the following scenario.  In Shasta County, a law is passed 
that creates “Cattle Trespass Officers” that monitor the 
whereabouts of cattle, property lines, and damages caused by 
cattle trespass.  Upon identifying trespassing cattle, the officer 
removes the cattle, attempts to identity the owner, and notifies 
the owner to come and get the cattle.  The mandatory presence 
and enforcement of external law prevents the informal norms from 
ever arising, much less being effective. 
The transaction costs are high in the Cattle Trespass Officer 
scenario. They are minimized under Ellickson’s theory of informal 
norms.  Indeed, that is a component of how welfare is maximized 
through the minimization of transaction costs.  It would be 
 
 300.  ELLICKSON, supra note 1, at 40. 
 301.  Id. 
 302.  Id. 
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inefficient, through the production of externalities, higher 
transaction costs, etc., to have a mandatory system of cattle 
trespass law and cattle trespass enforcers.  It is more efficient for 
residents to be able to conduct their workaday relations as they 
see fit, consistent with their inter-personal relationships.  The law 
implicitly recognizes this and protects the development of those 
norms by making optional any resort to external law.  A structure 
creating a mandatory Cattle Trespass Officer is unnecessary, 
unwieldy, and less efficient.  In addition, the rules imposed and 
sanctions created bear no relation to the close-knit community’s 
definition of welfare. 
Tribal communities in Public Law 280 states are little 
different—they are all subject to the actions of state law 
enforcement.303  Tribes already view the imposition of law by this 
exogenous entity as a fundamental intrusion in their culture, 
lifeways, and identity.  As mentioned before, the idea that tribal 
communities enjoy some degree of self-governing authority is not 
seriously in dispute.  Traditionally, Indian Law scholars and tribal 
advocates have asserted that self-governing authority, or 
sovereignty, is the basis of the argument for the preclusion of state 
law enforcement and revocation of Public Law 280. 
The problem with this argument is that it reduces to the 
dispute that states and tribes always have: “who is more 
sovereign?”  My theory here provides a substantively different 
basis for precluding state law enforcement, the informal norms of 
tribal communities maximize welfare within the community and 
result in greater public safety for both residents of Indian Country 
and those in neighboring non-Indian communities.  Here, I differ 
with Ellickson who suggests that the operation of informal norms 
serves to impoverish outsiders, or make them worse off.304  In this 
context, effective informal norms in a tribal community reduce the 
financial obligation of state law enforcement while also enhancing 
public safety for both communities. 
To be clear, tribal communities have long engaged in 
resolving the Texan problem through traditional informal 
remedies, such as banishment.305  Banishment is a sanction that 
 
 303.  See Pub. L. No. 83-280 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1162, 28 U.S.C. § 
1360, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321–26 (1953)). 
 304.  ELLICKSON, supra note 1, at 169. 
 305.  See JUSTIN B. RICHLAND & SARAH DEER, INTRODUCTION TO TRIBAL 
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arises from the violation of an informal norm.306 Tribal 
communities also have a history of addressing the Custer problem.  
Such a dispute with a foreign state was resolved either by war or 
by treaty.  Neither is an option for tribal communities in this day.  
So, the question is, how does the tribal community solve the 
Custer problem now?  Would solving the Custer problem solve 
their criminal problems?  Tribal communities, at least some of 
them, seem to fit the definition of a close-knit community set forth 
by Ellickson. 
A genuine solution cannot simply be the removal of the prior 
incorrect policy.  A fundamentally different approach than that 
employed by the TLOA is needed.  The principal problem with 
developing the best policy is that Congress must enact it.  There 
may be alternative methods for implementing the structure 
presented below, but passage of a specific piece of legislation 
implementing this targeted approach would ensure uniformity. 
B. Close-Knit Communities Solve Their Own Problems Best 
Two basic principles point to the conclusion that tribal 
communities solve tribal problems best.  First, a principle long 
codified by federal statutes demonstrates that tribal governments 
have the inherent authority and the capability of addressing 
criminal issues on their lands among Indians.  This fact is 
reflected in the ICCA exceptions precluding federal jurisdiction 
where the tribe has already prosecuted the offending Indian and it 
is further confirmed by the Supreme Court in Talton, Wheeler, and 
United States v. Lara.307  Second, federal statutes and case law 
recognize that criminal issues in Indian Country have an intra-
tribal character to them that makes them appropriate for 
resolution by local rules rather than external entities.  This is 
apparent in the exception to the ICCA regarding the preclusion of 
federal jurisdiction where the criminal conduct involves both an 
 
LEGAL STUDIES 359 (AltaMira Press 2010). 
 306.  Id. 
 307.  See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193; United States v. Wheeler, 
435 U.S. 313 (1978); Talton v. Mayers, 163 U.S. 376 (1896).  “This section 
shall not extend to . . . any Indian committing any offense in the Indian 
country who has been punished by the local law of the tribe . . . ”  General 
Crimes Act,18 U.S.C. § 1152 (2006). 
PEARLFINALWORD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/2/2014  10:57 AM 
86 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 19:32 
Indian offender and victim.308 
Tribal communities are not so distinct from other rural close-
knit communities.  Problems in these areas are best solved by the 
people who live there.  This is, perhaps, an easier and more 
general summary of Ellickson’s theory.  In the criminal context, 
this concept takes on an even more important role.  Assistant 
Secretary Washburn has explained that criminal law and 
jurisdiction are both important to community self-determination 
and that this concept has “long been settled as a matter of 
criminal law theory.”309  He continues on, stating “criminal laws 
codify the moral foundations of the community.”310  The import of 
criminal laws emanating from the community in which they are 
applicable has been recognized for decades.311  These individuals 
and families are what constitute a community, they create the 
norms regarding conduct that is and is not acceptable.  Local 
individuals and leaders are best positioned to (1) identify the 
problems in the community and (2) identify the norms at work 
within that particular community.  Again, these are the workaday 
affairs to which informal norms arise.  The fundamental problem 
with statutes like Public Law 280 is that a community is left 
without voice or choice in designing how their community is to be 
governed.  To use Ellickson’s terminology, they do not have a say 
in defining welfare and how to maximize it in the aggregate. 
 For tribal communities in Public Law 280 states, an outsider 
is not only policing them, but they are subject to laws that may 
not comport with their own tribal values.  This is why the former 
chairman of the Soboba Band made his reference to Custer’s 7th 
Cavalry—for the Soboba community there seemed to be no way of 
 
 308.  “This section shall not extend to offenses committed by one Indian 
against the person or property of another Indian . . .  ”  18 U.S.C. § 1152.  The 
importance of resolving intra-tribal disputes at the local level exists in the 
civil context as well in Indian Country, as in the case of Santa Clara Pueblo 
v. Martinez, where an enrollment dispute did not give rise to federal 
jurisdiction.  See 436 U.S. 49 (1978). 
 309.   Kevin K. Washburn, Federal Criminal Law and Tribal Self-
Determination, 84 N.C. L. REV. 779, 834 (2006). 
 310.   Id. 
 311.   Id.  “Classical scholars since at least Emil Durkheim have 
recognized a clear and strong relationship between community values and 
criminal law.  As Durkheim described, criminal laws are the tangible 
embodiment of the community's sacred moral values.”  Id. at 835 (citations 
omitted). 
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creating an alternative method of addressing the criminal issues 
on the reservation that complied with the needs, values, and 
culture of the tribal community.312 Where a Custer exerts 
authority over all of these areas, it should come as no surprise 
that the tribal community feels unheard and unfairly treated.313  
This tension undermines the ability of law enforcement, and other 
aspects of the state justice system, to be effective.  Simply put, 
members of communities must be invested in the process (how the 
rules are created) and the product (the implementation and 
outcome of the rules).  As stated by Basso in his description of 
Western Apache, the Tribal language, stories, and the place all 
bear directly on the identity of the community and of the 
individuals.314  Therefore, the Custer crushes the identity of the 
community in addition to less efficiently addressing concerns over 
criminal conduct in the community. 
C. Insulating Informal Norms by Requiring Exhaustion 
Informal norms should govern close-knit tribal communities, 
but members of the tribal community must have access to law 
enforcement—be it state or federal.  There is a structure that 
allows for the intervention of external law enforcement that does 
not result in such intervention amounting to a Custer’s conduct.  
The key component is making access to external law enforcement 
voluntary on the part of the community member rather than a 
mandatory obligation of the external entity.  By making the 
intervention of external law enforcement voluntary rather than 
mandatory, the circumstance resembles that in Shasta County 
where an action in trespass was available to parties, but not 
imposed on them. 
An exhaustion requirement would serve to make external law 
enforcement’s job easier as well.  Individuals in the community 
 
 312.  Kelly, supra note 2. 
 313.  Of course, some tribes in the present day borrow heavily from their 
state and federal counterparts in creating a criminal code or establishing 
procedural rules for the prosecution of charges against individuals.  
Importantly, tribes that engage in such borrowing do so by choice rather than 
by mandate which makes a difference.  Regardless, even where tribes borrow 
heavily from state counterparts, they may have their own law enforcement 
agencies who actually enforce the law within the tribal community—a 
distinct difference with tribal communities in Public Law 280 states. 
 314.  BASSO, supra note 108. 
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will develop the facts and issues and attempt to resolve them 
organically, which may reduce the caseload for officers at the 
outset.  In addition, even if community members are unable to 
resolve the dispute, issues of contention and agreement will have 
been identified, thereby doing some of the investigative work for 
the officer already.  This allows for a quicker resolution of the 
issue. 
Finally, this reduces the antagonism that typically exists 
between external law enforcement and tribal communities.  Under 
this structure, respect and deference to the tribal community 
precedes the external law enforcement—the role is substantially 
different.  Where tension is reduced, it allows the external law 
enforcement to more easily resolve the dispute. 
D. Native Nation Building through Informal Norms 
This structure sends a very different message to tribal 
communities than that expressed in Section 221 of the TLOA.315  
The mere (optional) modification of Public Law 280, by providing 
the federal government with shared jurisdiction, tells tribes that 
they are ill fit to create, develop, and regulate behavior in their 
own communities.316 The exhaustion requirement creates an 
incentive in tribal communities to reinvigorate, enhance, and 
sustain their traditional values and customs and put them into 
practice on a daily basis.  This is an opportunity to engage in true 
Native Nation building by combining aspects of traditional tribal 
culture with the demands of 21st century society. 
Although the history of criminal issues for tribes under Public 
Law 280 states is dark, there may be a benefit to creating a policy 
that re-build these normative structures from the ground up.  
From this perspective, the near total absence of tribal courts and 
police forces in Public Law 280 states presents an opportunity for 
real comprehensive change in these communities. 
E. Approaches for Implementation 
Implementing the policy of insulating informal norms from 
external law enforcement can take a variety of forms.  Two will be 
 
 315.  See Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-211, § 221, 
124 Stat. 2258 (2010). 
 316.  See id.  
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covered here: legislation and through cooperative agreements.  
There is precedent for  the legislative approach to implementing 
Native Nation building. Congress passed the Indian Self-
Determination Act in 1975 and authorized tribes to contract with 
the federal government and take over particular trust services 
previously carried out by local BIA agency offices.317  This 
legislation came about during a renewed push for self-
determination in Congress and the Executive Branch, it was a 
response to the growing frustration with the performance of the 
BIA.318  The money previously appropriated to the BIA office for 
discharging that duty would be provided to the tribe instead.319  
For example, a tribe could propose to take over the realty 
functions of the local BIA office and would then be responsible for 
carrying out the realty duties, such as negotiating leases and 
performing appraisals, for tribal and individual beneficiaries.  In 
1987, a pilot program was created in which a number of tribes 
were selected to test the efficacy of the program.  The same 
approach could be used to implement the policy of Native Nation 
building in Public Law 280 states. 
Even in the absence of a legislative directive, close-knit tribal 
communities could enter into cooperative agreements with local 
law enforcement to identify the parameters where the tribal 
community will be left alone.  This type of agreement is subject to 
politics and the respective bargaining positions of the parties.  In 
other words, the external law enforcement has to agree to not 
exercise its federally created authority under certain criteria to be 
negotiated in the cooperative agreement.  Under this approach, 
community leaders from both groups would have to come to 
recognize the sovereignty of the other, which may be asking a lot. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
There are many benefits to the TLOA that affect the Indian 
Country in non-Public Law 280 states, but the rhetoric regarding 
its successes is plainly inapplicable to Public Law 280 tribes.  The 
number of affected tribes in mandatory Public Law 280 states is 
 
 317.  Indian Self Determination and Education Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 
93-638, 88 Stat. 2203 (1975). 
 318.  Id.  
 319.  Id. 
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simply too great to warrant the type of absentee policy enacted in 
the TLOA. The approach offered in the TLOA pacifies tribal 
communities by moving away from solitary reliance upon the state 
to enforce criminal laws and prosecute offenders while shifting the 
burden to the federal government, which remains ill equipped to 
effectively address crime in Indian Country.  The Custer role has 
been doubled to include both the state and federal governments.  
Local communities solve local problems best.  Indian tribes are no 
exception and are also well positioned, in light of the history of 
tribal political and governmental structures, to accept this 
responsibility and succeed. Many tribal communities in Public 
Law 280 states will meet the definition of a close-knit group, and 
still more will contain those cultural and geographical isolating 
traits that enhance the efficacy of informal norms in those 
communities.  Informal norms are likely to be more effective in 
maximizing aggregate community welfare, as defined by the 
community.  This is the essence of self-government, and if allowed 
to operate through social forces, then the results will likely bear 
fruit for both close-knit group members as well as outsiders. 
 
